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Kathleen A. Bergin*
I. Introduction
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,1 the Supreme Court outlawed the Executive
Branch policy of subjecting alleged "enemy combatants" to indefinite
detention without formal charges, access to an attorney, or procedural
due process protections. The irony of imposing such restraints while the
United States fought to "liberate" the people of Iraq was not lost on
Justice O'Connor who reminded us that: "It is during our most
challenging and uncertain moments.., that we must preserve our
commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.",2 The
decision in Hamdi helped repair America's standing in the international
community at a time when other nations questioned its commitment to
democratic ideals.
Hamdi is just one of the many cases decided against a backdrop of
extant global insecurity where the Court has measured the
constitutionality of domestic governmental practices against international
expectations.4 This trend is punctuated by the recent retirement of
. Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law, Houston, TX; LL.M., New
York University Law School; J.D., University of Baltimore School of Law. Special
thanks to my friend and mentor, Derrick Bell, for inspiring and contributing to the
development of this Article. Thanks also to Shelby D. Moore, Alfred Brophy, Bryan K.
Fair, Maxine Goodman, Njeri Mathis, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Antoinette Sedillo-
Lopez, and Gloria Valencia-Weber for insightful comments on earlier drafts, and the
participants of the 2005 Southeast/Southwest People of Color Scholarship Conference
who attended a presentation of this Article. I am indebted to John D. Fassett, former law
clerk to Supreme Court Justice Stanley Reed, for bringing the Court to life through our
many correspondences. I also thank my able research assistant, Ellie Portwood, whose
tireless efforts are woven through each and every sentence of this Article.
1. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
2. Id. at 532.
3. See, e.g., Conor Gearty, Editorial, A Blow for Freedom, THE GUARDIAN, July 6,
2004, at A17; Augusta Conchiglia, US.: Land of the Unfree, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE,
Jan. 2004, at 21.
4. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267 (2004); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003). The international implications of these cases are discussed infra notes 217-34.
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Justice O'Connor, who strived through her voting record and extra-
judicial activities to preserve America's reputation abroad.5 O'Connor's
retirement provides a timely opportunity to investigate to what extent the
need to authenticate an image of American democracy steers the course
of domestic constitutional development in times of international crisis.
This Article undertakes that task. Focusing primarily on Brown v. Board
of Education,6 it explains how the Court's unanimous 1954 decision to
outlaw racially segregated schools reflects in large part a judicial effort
to overcome political obstacles that obstructed the Nation's Cold War
initiatives. This same international consciousness influenced the
resolution of Hamdi and other recent cases that reconsidered established
constitutional standards against a backdrop of escalating international
volatility.
Why undertake this project? First, in the case of Brown, accounting
for the influence of the Cold War takes us closer to understanding why a
unanimous Court initiated such a radical departure from cultural and
jurisprudential traditions. Second, teaching the interdependence of law,
5. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 604-07 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 331 (O'Connor, J.). Apart from her judicial decisions, Justice O'Connor publicly
promotes the United States' system of government as a model for developing nations to
follow. See Elizabeth F. Defeis, A Tribute to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor from an
International Perspective, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 391, 392 (1997).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Two separate opinions constitute the decisions collectively
identified in the popular literature as "Brown." In the first decision, which would become
known as Brown I, the Court held that racially segregated schools violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 484. In the second decision,
which would become known as Brown II, the Court set forth procedures to remedy that
violation. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The legal
challenge originated in four lower court cases involving school segregation statutes in
Kansas, Virginia, South Carolina, and Delaware that the Supreme Court consolidated on
appeal. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951); Briggs v. Elliott,
103 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.S.C. 1952); Davis v. Prince Edward County, 103 F. Supp. 337
(E.D. Va. 1952); Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, Gebhart v. Belton, 91
A.2d 137 (Del. 1952). A companion case to Brown I struck down segregated schools in
the District of Columbia under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Unless otherwise indicated, references in this
Article to "Brown" refer to Brown L
7. See Mary L. Dudziak, Brown and the Idea of Progress in American Legal
History: A Comment on William Nelson, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 851, 851 (2004) ("If we
isolate Brown from the rest of history, it not only narrows our understanding of [other]
historiographic questions, it also leaves us unable to fully understand Brown itself.").
That no other case in the history of the Supreme Court has achieved Brown's iconic
status spotlights the importance of understanding the cause and consequences of the
decision. See Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown,
118 HARv. L. REV. 973, 974 (2005) (book review) (naming Brown "perhaps the most
important judgment ever handed down by an American Supreme Court"); DERRICK A.
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politics, and social progress in times of conflict rebuts the presumption
that courts operate in an institutional vacuum.8 Third, and perhaps most
importantly, investigating the foreign policy underpinnings of Brown
helps explain why the Court, though it struck down racially segregated
schools, declined to order school officials in the South to immediately
and effectively comply with that ruling.9 This approach to Brown in turn
helps explain the sensitivity some Justices today have shown in Hamdi,10
Lawrence v. Texas," Roper v. Simmons, 12 and elsewhere 3 for preserving
America's reputation as a fair and inclusive democracy, while creating
some uncertainty as to whether our most cherished rights will be
recognized in practice.
14
Gauging whether international political crises influence the outcome
of domestic judicial decisions is no easy task. With respect to Brown,
the incongruity between the racial practices of the United States and
those of other nations is not expressly cited by the Court as a reason for
BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCA TION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES
FOR RACIAL REFORM 4 (2004) [hereinafter SILENT COVENANTS] (describing Brown as a
legal "landmark"); Jack M. Balkin, Brown v. Board of Education: A Critical
Introduction, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE
NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION
3-4 (Balkin ed., 2001) (calling Brown "the single most honored opinion in the Supreme
Court's corpus"); JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY xxvii (2001) (identifying Brown as "the most
eagerly awaited and dramatic judicial decision of modem times"); Mary L. Dudziak,
Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 62 (1988) (ranking
Brown "one of the most celebrated civil rights cases in American History") [hereinafter
Cold War Imperative]. Only Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856),
which provided a catalyst for the Civil War, rivals Brown in terms of social significance.
Unlike Brown, however, a general consensus exists that Dred Scott was wrongly decided.
See Matthew D. Lassiter, 2005 Survey of Books Related to the Law: Does the Supreme
Court Matter? Civil Rights and the Inherent Politicization of Constitutional Law, 103
MICH. L. REv. 1401, 1405 (2005).
8. See Claybome Carson, Jim Crow's Enduring Legacy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1243,
1247 (2005) (book review) ("To argue that even Supreme Court Justices pay attention to
political and social realities should hardly surprise anyone familiar with contemporary
scholarship in the field of constitutional law."); see also Michael J. Klarman, Brown at
50, 90 VA. L. REV. 1613, 1619 (2004) [hereinafter Brown at 50] ("All judicial decision-
making involves extralegal or political considerations, such as the judges' personal
values, social mores and external political pressure.").
9. See infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
10. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
11. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
13. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003).
14. See infra notes 242-47 and accompanying text.
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rejecting public school segregation. 15  For most of the Justices, the
purported educational impact of racial segregation provided a compelling
reason for the Court's decision independent of the Cold War, as did the
moral outrage of segregation itself.16 The Justices did not pursue a Cold
War line of questioning at oral argument, 17 nor did they discuss the
foreign policy implications of desegregation during the Court's judicial
conferences.' 8 When placed in historical context, however, the appellate
record, judicial conference notes, and personal correspondences with a
former Supreme Court law clerk, 19 all point to foreign policy as one
reason why Brown at least emerged as a unanimous decision. In Hamdi,
Lawrence, Roper, and other recent cases, the impact of America's role in
the War on Terror is evident in the language of the decisions
themselves.2 °
This Article assesses the role of the judiciary in preserving an image
15. The Court conducted two rounds of oral arguments in Brown L The first took
place in December 1952, the second in December 1953. Though only one argument is
typically allowed in a Supreme Court appeal, the Justices agreed to order a second oral
argument to delay its decision and work towards achieving the strongest possible
consensus for striking down public school segregation without any concurring or
dissenting opinions if possible. The strategy of delay also was devised to enable the
South to adjust to the prospect of a desegregation ruling. Generally accepted as the most
comprehensive account of the oral arguments and internal deliberations in Brown is
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 545-749 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter SIMPLE
JUSTICE]. Other excellent histories include Stephen Ellmann, The Rule of Law and the
Achievement of Unanimity in Brown, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 741, 750-57 (2004-2005);
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 292-312 (2004) [hereinafter JIM
CROW]; PATTERSON, supra note 7, at 46-85; Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really
Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (1991); Dennis J.
Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-
1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 34-44 (1979).
16. See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
17. Briefs and transcripts of the oral arguments in Brown I and Brown II are
compiled in 49-49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Kurland & Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter
LANDMARK BRIEFS].
18. Judicial conferences are conducted in secret, but notes taken by Justices Burton,
Clark, Douglas, and Jackson during the conferences on Brown I and Brown II were
subsequently released to the public and compiled into a first person narrative of the
deliberations. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), THE PRIVATE
DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (Dickson ed., 2001)
[hereinafter CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS].
19. In preparation for this Article, the author corresponded several times with John
D. Fassett, law clerk to Justice Stanley Reed during the 1953-1954 judicial term. Copies
of the correspondence are on file with the author.
20. See infra notes 215-34 and accompanying text.
400 [Vol. 26:397
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of American democracy during times of international crisis. Following
this introduction, Part II focuses on Brown and the academic literature
that contextualizes America's school segregation controversy within the
larger framework of mid-century global instability.21 It supplements
previous scholarship that attributes the outcome in Brown to Cold War
considerations by identifying elements of the appellate record previously
overlooked in the literature.
Parts III and IV build on those studies that examine Brown from the
outside by probing it from the inside. The discussion examines the
Court's internal deliberations to demonstrate that the political
environment created by the Cold War did in fact influence the outcome
of the case. Significant attention is given to the role of Justice Stanley
Reed, whose vote in Brown was necessary to produce a unanimous
opinion. Part III explains why unanimity was so critical to the success of
desegregation and identifies the personal, philosophical, and pragmatic
convictions that initially led Justice Reed to draft a dissent proposing to
uphold segregation.22 In light of these concerns, Part IV finds the
explanation for Justice Reed's turn-about in his anxiety over the looming
global security situation and trust in the Executive Branch to solve that
crisis.23  The historical record suggests that Justice Reed considered
unanimity in Brown a necessary response to the global exigencies and
domestic racial challenges that converged during the Cold War.2 4
Part V transports the lessons of the Cold War into the twenty-first
century's War on Terrorism by identifying a series of recent cases where
the Court engaged in constitutional adjudication with an eye towards
protecting the United States' image among other nations. Like Brown,
21. See infra notes 28-70 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 71-154 and accompanying text. Though Reed struggled to reach
a conclusion on the constitutionality of racially segregated schools, he considered Brown
the most important case of his judicial career and agreed with the prevailing view that "if
it was not the most important decision in the history of the Court, it was very close." See
SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 709.
23. See infra notes 157-212 and accompanying text.
24. Barry Cushman is correct in stating that "it is always hazardous to offer general
characterizations of a justice's jurisprudence, as the complexity of a jurist's record so
often confounds stereotypical assessment." Barry Cushman, The Great Depression and
the New Deal, University of Virginia Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Working
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 23, 14-15 (June 2005). In light of his conversion in
Brown, perhaps this observation rings truer for Justice Reed than for many of his
colleagues. Nonetheless, as Cushman's impressive survey of the Court's New Deal
jurisprudence suggests, a jurist's judicial philosophy comes into view by contextualizing
her or his judicial record against the backdrop of social, economic, and political realities.
This Article does exactly that with respect to Justice Reed.
2006]
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the decisions in Lawrence and Roper struck down state statutes that
imperiled the United States' public commitment to fairness and justice. 5
Other cases, such as Hamdi, Grutter v. Bollinger, and Vieth v. Jubelirer
show an even more aggressive international consciousness than was
present in Brown.26 Whereas Brown conformed domestic constitutional
standards to international norms in a way that had the full support of the
Executive Branch, the Court today has aligned judicial outcomes with
global expectations in outright contradiction to Executive Branch
policy.27  Part VI concludes by assessing the Court's attempt to
authenticate an image of American democracy while accounting for the
reality that many of the democratic principles espoused by the Court
have yet to be fully realized in practice.
II. Domestic Liabilities in a Global Crisis
Cold War politics are not expressly mentioned in Brown as a reason
for expanding the meaning of equality under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Instead, the justifications offered for rejecting "separate but equal" public
schools relate to the adverse impact the Court concluded those schools
would have on the intellectual development, psychological wellness, and
probable life outcomes of Black children. Yet Brown was more than a
well-intentioned attempt to redirect the racial priorities of a region bent
on perpetuating the life of Jim Crow. Considered against the appellate
record established in the case, unanimity in Brown inescapably meant to
forestall a foreign relations nightmare. This Part builds upon earlier
studies that place Brown among the Court's most important national
security decisions by identifying relevant aspects of the record that
situate the desegregation controversy within the larger context of the
Cold War. It lays the foundation for that discussion by first examining
the decision itself.
A. Engaging the Old Guard
Brown held that public school segregation violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.28 It did so by creating
an exception to the 1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson,29 which permitted
25. See infra notes 224-34 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 215-23 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
28. Brown, 347 U.S. at 484.
29. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
[Vol. 26:397
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states to segregate access to "separate but equal" public facilities.
Though that standard remained applicable in other circumstances, it did
not apply to public schools where racial segregation was found to be
"inherently unequal., 3 0  This conclusion rested on a finding that
segregation interfered with the psychological well-being of Black school
children. According to the Court, segregation created lasting liabilities
that could not be overcome by any physical or financial parity between
Black and White schools. 3' The Court explained that:
Segregation of whites and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it
has the sanction of law; for the policy of separating the races is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of
inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the
sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and
mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
32
Social science evidence provided an empirical justification for
rejecting the "separate but equal" doctrine in the context of public
schools. The constitutional question could not be resolved by resort to
the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment nor its interpretation in
Plessy since neither accounted for the special role of public education in
the twentieth century.33 By that time, the Court noted, education was
"required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. 34  States could not condition access to public schools on
account of race, the Court held, because education served "the most
important function of state and local governments, 35 and reinforced a
"democratic society. 36
30. Brown, 347 U.S. at 484.
31. The Court rested its conclusion on the findings of social scientific evidence
cited in the famously maligned "Footnote 11." See id. at 495 n. 11. For a review of the
literature on Footnote 11, see Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11,
and Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 279, 292-96 (2005); Sanjay Mody, Brown
Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme Court's Quest for
Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 793 (2002).
32. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
33. Id. at 490-92.
34. Id. at 493.
35. Id.
36. Id. States remained free to restrict access to other public institutions in
compliance with the "separate but equal" standard, however.
2006]
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B. Critical Crossroads
Scholars including Derrick Bell, Mary Dudziak, and others consider
Brown a critical Cold War case. To make their point, they draw parallels
between the Cold War objectives of the Truman Administration and the
political consequences of a judicial decision rejecting the
constitutionality of segregated schools. In the years leading up to Brown,
they explain, President Truman had sought to stabilize the geo-political
balance upturned by communist expansion by persuading third world
nations to adopt a democratic form of government. White supremacy,
however, manifest through racially segregated public schools, made it
nearly impossible for the Administration to win the trust and loyalty of
Black and Brown populations.37 When the Court in Brown outlawed
segregated schools, it affirmed the dignity and equality of all citizens in a
participatory government. Doing so, these scholars assert, restored
America's image in the world, handing the United States a crucial
ideological advantage over the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold
War.
Bell is perhaps most emphatic in his contention that Brown reflected
the Cold War priorities of the Truman Administration rather than an
authentic commitment to racial equality, integration, or better schools.38
He places Brown on a continuum of events, including the abolition of
slavery in the North, President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation,
and the Reconstruction Amendments, that in his view advanced the
course of racial progress only by chance.39 To Bell, each measure was
adopted to meet an economic, political, or military emergency, making
Blacks the incidental beneficiaries of White-oriented goals.40  This
phenomenon of "interest-convergence" doomed the desegregation
campaign until racially separate schools could be packaged as a liability
37. See Brown at 50, supra note 8, at 1620.
38. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Remediation: An Historical Perspective on
Current Conditions, 52 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 5, 12 (1976) [hereinafter Racial
Remediation]; see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524-25 (1980) [hereinafter
Interest-Convergence]. Bell expanded on this theme in subsequent works. See SILENT
COVENANTS, supra note 7, at 59-68; DERRICK BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES 116-19
(1998) [hereinafter AFROLANTICA LEGACIES].
39. See SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 7, at 50-58; AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra
note 38, at 116-19.
40. See SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 7, at 49 ("[B]lack rights are recognized and
protected when and only so long as policymakers perceive that such advances will further
interests that are their primary concern."); Racial Remediation, supra note 38, at 12.
[Vol. 26:397
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to Whites. The condition for doing so did not occur until mid-century
when the need to salvage America's reputation outweighed the Nation's
material and emotional commitment to White privilege. Brown became
possible, Bell concludes, only when Black demands for racial justice
coincided with the government's interest in global stability.4'
Mary Dudziak documented proof of Bell's thesis in a 1988 Stanford
Law Review article.42 She concluded that the Truman Administration's
racial justice platform, State Department warnings against the
international impact of Southern policies and practices, and the public
relations nightmare caused by America's deplorable treatment of Blacks
created a desegregation "imperative" the Court could not ignore.43 The
Justices themselves appreciated the Court's ability to promote foreign
policy and publicly acknowledged the impact of domestic segregation on
world affairs.44 Retrospectives commemorating the 50th anniversary of
41. See SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 7, at 59. Bell sees a contemporary
manifestation of this "interest-convergence" theory in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003), wherein the Court upheld narrowly tailored race-based admission programs in
higher education. As Bell points out, the Court in Grutter declined to acknowledge that
traditional admission standards privilege White applicants, choosing instead to justify its
conclusion based on the strategic and economic advantages of educational diversity. The
Court specifically noted that more than 300 organizations, including educators, labor
unions, Fortune 500 companies, and retired military and civilian defense officials
submitted briefs in support of affirmative action. To Bell, this line of reasoning shows
that the Court was willing to accommodate the educational demands of non-White
applicants because it appreciated the benefits of "diversity in the classroom, on the work
floor, and in the military, not the need to address past and continuing racial barriers" to
higher education. See Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622,
1625 (2003).
42. See Cold War Imperative, supra note 7; see also MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR
CIVIL RIGHTS, RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000) [hereinafter COLD
WAR CIVIL RIGHTS]. For a sympathetic review of arguments proffered in Dudziak's
book, see Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African-American
Fortunes-Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
369 (2002).
43. See Cold War Imperative, supra note 7, at 73-113.
44. In 1954, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated that the American system of Justice
was on trial "at home and abroad," and lauded the role courts could play in confirming
American ideals and contributing to world stability. Justice Douglas wrote about the
ideological conflicts of the Cold War upon his return from a trip to India in 1950. He
considered domestic policies towards Blacks "a powerful factor" in the United States
relationship with that nation. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, STRANGE LANDS AND FRIENDLY
PEOPLE 296 (1951). In 1953, he wrote of traveling to Pakistan where he learned that
Asians sympathized with the Soviet Union because they viewed the United States as an
unfair and intolerant nation. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, BEYOND THE HIGH HIMILAYAS
317, 321-23 (1953). These sources are recounted in COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note
42, at 104-06. The other Justices traveled extensively before Brown and "could not have
helped but recognize the international concern over American civil rights abuses." See
2006]
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Brown also recount the strategic benefits of desegregation to America's
standing in the Cold War.45
The milieu of Cold War hysteria paints only part of the picture
leading to the unanimous decision in Brown. Shifting the focus away
from the external political climate to the Cold War arguments placed
directly on the record in Brown clarifies the relationship between
international politics and constitutional adjudication. To date, the
id. At least one judge presiding over the challenge to racially segregated schools at the
trial level appreciated the scope of America's image problem. Judge Waties Waring,
dissenting from the decision that upheld segregated schools in Clarendon County, South
Carolina, noted the "clear and important" consequences of racial segregation,
"particularly at [a] time when our national leaders are called upon to show to the world
that our democracy means what it says and that it is a true democracy and there is no
undercover suppression of the rights of any of our citizens because of the pigmentation of
their skins." Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 548 (E.D.S.C. 1951) (Waring, J.,
dissenting).
45. See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, Brown as a Cold War Case, 91 J. AM. HIST. 32
(2004); Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Brown v. Board of Education in International
Context, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 493, 493 (2004) ("Although the Brown decision
did not refer to the international stage, there is little doubt that the climate of the era
explains, in significant part, why apartheid in America began to unravel after World War
II."); Brown at 50, supra note 8, at 1620; RICHARD DELGADO, JUSTICE AT WAR 157-61
(2003). For additional sources, see Cold War Imperative, supra note 7, at 64 n.9.
Though Brown measurably improved the United States' legitimacy in the eyes of the
world during the Cold War, debate continues over the decision's actual impact on
domestic race relations and educational reform. See, e.g., Finkelman, supra note 7, at
978 ("[W]e are far better off as a society with the result in Brown than we would have
been with a different outcome."); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, 2005 Survey of Books
Related to the Law: For Whom Does the Bell Toll: The Bell Tolls for Brown?, 103 MICH.
L. REV. 1507, 1534-35 (2005) (defending the moral and practical benefits of the victory
in Brown); Jack Greenberg, Brown v. Board of Education: An Axe in the Frozen Sea of
Racism, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 869, 888 (2004) (crediting Brown with transforming power
relationships that privileged Whites); ROBERT J. COTrROL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION 243 (2003) ("[T]he terrain would
have been much bumpier and the playing field an awful lot less level without the effort of
those men and women who developed the strategy, argued the case, and changed history
in Brown v. Board of Education."). Others criticize Brown for accommodating Southern
obstruction that continues to interfere with meaningful public school desegregation. See,
e.g., SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 7, at 2 (describing Brown as "a decision that
promised so much and, by its terms, accomplished so little."); Bryan K. Fair, The Darker
Face of Brown: The Promise and Reality of the Decision Remain Unreconciled, 88
JUDICATURE 80, 81 (2004) (regretting that Brown "appear[s] to give substantive reform
with one hand only to take it away with the other"); JIM CRow, supra note 15, at 441-42
(positing that Brown unnecessarily provoked a White backlash that disrupted racial
progress being made through political channels); CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL
DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION xv (2004) ("[Flifty years after Brown there is little left to celebrate."). For a
bibliography of scholarship related to Brown, see William H. Manz, Brown v. Board of
Education: A Selected Annotated Bibliography, 96 LAw LBR. J. 245 (2004).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss2/2
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literature that examines Brown from this perspective draws its
conclusions almost exclusively from the foreign policy concerns
articulated in briefs submitted to the Court by the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Department
of Justice.46 Yet an even broader coalition of organizations submitted
briefs that argued the centrality of desegregation to the Nation's survival,
including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the American
Veterans Association, and the American Federation of Teachers.47 In
partnership with the NAACP and the Department of Justice, this alliance
wove a case against segregation that served the Nation's Cold War
interests in three ways: it capitalized on the allied victory of World War
II, promoted peaceful democratic proliferation, and neutralized the
influence of anti-American propaganda.
C. Launching the Assault
The NAACP and its supporting amici in Brown portrayed the Cold
War as an extension of the allied victory in World War II which
confirmed the United States' commitment to racial justice and equality.
The Brief submitted by the NAACP explained that the South's racist
ideology contravened American values and depleted the political capital
the Nation had earned throughout the Twentieth Century "fighting
racism at home and abroad.",48  The American Veterans Committee
agreed, urging the Court to outlaw segregated schools in the interest of
"the national welfare both at home and abroad." 9 It considered "the
elimination of racial discrimination" a "core" democratic principle and
condemned the South for perpetrating the same brand of racism the
Committee's members fought against in World War 11.50
Building on this theme, the briefs juxtaposed the evils of
46. See, e.g., Cold War Imperative, supra note 7, at 109-12; PHILIP A. KLINKNER,
ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH 234-41 (1999); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 130-32 (3d rev. ed. 1974); A. BLAUSTEIN & C.
FERGUSON, JR., DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW: THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE
SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASES 10-12 (1957).
47. See generally LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 17.
48. Br. for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and for Resp'ts in No. 10 on Reargument
at 31, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter NAACP Brief], reprinted
in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 17, at 544-45.
49. Br. for Am. Veterans Comm., Inc., Amicus Curiae at 2, Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Veterans Brief], reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 17, at 246.
50. Id.
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segregation with the proven benefits of desegregation. The NAACP
reminded the Court that Black citizens contributed to the Nation's
victory in World War II through volunteer military service and skilled
work in desegregated factory production units.5 The briefs also credited
America's post-War dominance to desegregation in the armed services
that occurred under President Truman's orders in 1948.52 The American
Federation of Teachers verified the "universal" consensus among
America's military elite that an integrated regiment "is desirable and
works out very well in spite of all contrary predictions. 53 The resulting
visual of desegregated schools as a training ground for integrated
military service evoked a strategy for projecting America's global
prominence into the Cold War.
Second, the briefs showed that segregation directly threatened the
Nation's survival because it compromised America's ability to promote
democracy among emerging nations as a strategy of peaceful communist
containment. The Department of Justice urged the Court to place the
problem of racial discrimination "in the context of the present world
struggle between freedom and tyranny," maintaining that the United
States could not present democracy as the "most civilized and most
secure form of government yet devised" without mending "existing
flaws" in its own political system.54 The "factor of color," as the
American Federation of Teachers described it, discouraged
geographically strategic "sections of the darker world" from aligning
with the United States against the Soviet Union.55 A constitutional
51. See NAACP Brief, supra note 48, at 14, reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 17, at 55-56 ("Extensive desegregation has taken place without major
incidents in the armed services in both Northern and Southern installations and involving
officers and enlisted men from all parts of the country, including the South .... During
the last war, many factories both in the North and South hired Negroes on a non-
segregated, non-discriminatory basis.").
52. Additional Br. of the Am. Fed'n of Teachers as Amicus Curiae at 22, Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 [hereinafter Teachers Brief], reprinted in 49A LANDMARK
BRIEFS, supra note 17, at 422.
53. Id. This argument was somewhat disingenuous. In reality, notable military
leaders dragged their feet implementing Truman's desegregation order, including then
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee in 1948 in defense of segregated units. See SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at
322.
54. Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 [hereinafter DOJ Brief], reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 17, at
121.
55. Teachers Brief, supra note 52, at 25, reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 17, at 425.
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commitment to racial equality was needed to authenticate American
democracy in the eyes of developing nations. 56 "Survival of our country
in the present international situation is inevitably tied to resolution of this
domestic issue," the NAACP cautioned.
57
Third, segregation proved a potent source of anti-American
propaganda that diminished America's influence and standing in the
world community. As the ACLU explained, "[l]egally imposed
segregation in our country, in any shape, manner or form, weakens our
program to build and strengthen world democracy and combat
totalitarianism. ' 58 In the "ideological world conflict" of the Cold War, it
warned, "[w]e cannot afford, nor will the world permit us, to rest upon
democratic pretensions unrelated to reality. ' 59 The American Federation
of Teachers told of how the Nation's failings, "so far as people of color
are concerned," received constant attention at the United Nations and in
"the press of [other] countries., 60  The resulting strain on diplomatic
relations made it difficult for the United States to mediate "upheavals
taking place among the darker people of the world.",61 Desegregation, in
contrast, promised to create "a reservoir of good will for us in the vast
world of color" by confirming "to millions in Asia and Africa that the
United States is willing to give more than lip service to the principles on
which it is founded.,
62
The Department of Justice punctuated this narrative, pointing to
White business owners in the Nation's capital who embarrassed the
United States in "the conduct of foreign relations" by refusing to service
Black foreign diplomats.63 Episodes like these subjected the United
56. See Teachers Brief, supra note 52, at 5, reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 17, at 405 ("A decision in favor of integrated schooling on every level is
necessary, not only to give substance to our declared principles but to win over the
peoples of Asia and Africa to a belief in the sincerity of the United States.").
57. NAACP Brief, supra note 48, at 194, reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra
note 17, at 707.
58. Br. on Behalf of Am. Civil Liberties Union, et. al as Amici Curiae at 186,
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 [hereinafter ACLU Brief], reprinted in 49
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 17, at 186.
59. ACLU Brief, supra note 58, at 28, reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra
note 17, at 183.
60. Teachers Brief, supra note 52, at 25, reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 17, at 425.
61. Id.
62. Teachers Brief, supra note 52, at 25, reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 17, at 425.
63. See DOJ Brief, supra note 54, at 7, reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra
note 17, at 120-21.
2006]
13
PACE LAWREVIEW
States to constant attack "in the foreign press, over the foreign radio, and
[in] the United Nations., 64 The "graphic failure of democracy" in the
Nation's capitol and elsewhere gave foreign interests, most notably the
Soviet Union, "the most effective kind of ammunition for their
propaganda warfare. 65 Even "friendly nations" questioned the United
States' "devotion to the democratic faith., 66  In France, Austria,
Germany, and Belgium, the ACLU wrote, both the liberal and
conservative press accused the United States of fabricating an image of
democracy that masked its "actual practices at home. 67
Public school segregation was an especially damaging and
persuasive propaganda theme. The ACLU reported that segregated
schools had been the "subject of much adverse press comment" in those
foreign countries the United States "was trying to keep in the democratic
camp."68 School segregation had been "singled out for hostile foreign
comment in the United Nations and elsewhere," the Department of
Justice confirmed, leading other nations to question how "such a practice
can exist in a country which professes to be a staunch supporter of
freedom, justice and democracy. ' 69 Racial segregation jeopardized "the
effective maintenance of our moral leadership of the free and democratic
nations of the world.,
70
These submissions situated the school desegregation controversy
64. DOJ Brief, supra note 54, at 7, reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note
17, at 122. Charges against the United States for genocide against Blacks had been
brought in the United Nations. This was particularly damaging given the United States'
role in creating the world body. See Cold War Imperative, supra note 7, at 94-98. For a
general history of the United Nations and the formative role of the United States, see
STANLEY MEISLER, UNITED NATIONS: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS 3-20 (1995).
65. DOJ Brief, supra note 54, at 7, reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note
17, at 119, 122. In 1949, the U.S. embassy in Moscow described the status of Black
Americans as "[o]ne of the principal Soviet propaganda themes regarding the United
States." See Cold War Imperative, supra note 7, at 89.
66. DOJ Brief, supra note 54, at 6, reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note
17, at 121.
67. See ACLU Brief, supra note 58, at 28-31, reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 17, at 183-86. Criticism also came from British, Norwegian, Dutch, and
Greek press outlets that viewed the United States as hypocritical "in claiming to be the
champion of democracy while permitting practices of racial discrimination" within its
borders. For a survey of anti-American propaganda on this issue, see Cold War
Imperative, supra note 7, at 80-93.
68. ACLU Brief, supra note 58, at 28, reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra
note 17, at 183.
69. DOJ Brief, supra note 54, at 8, reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note
17, at 123.
70. Id.
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within the larger context of America's twentieth century world liberation
campaign. Doing so emphasized the interplay between law and politics
at a time of international crisis which ultimately steered the course of
domestic constitutional development in response to the Cold War.
III. Global Security Confronts Judicial Restraint
The Cold War arguments pressed by the NAACP and its supporting
amici did not immediately persuade every Justice in Brown to reject
segregated schools. Most reluctant to alter established constitutional
standards of equality appeared to be Justice Stanley Reed. At the Court's
initial conference following the first round of oral arguments, Justice
Reed announced his intent to vote in favor of the South under the
"separate but equal" standard established in Plessy v. Ferguson.71 He
began work on a draft dissent once it became clear that a majority of his
colleagues leaned in the opposite direction.72 Though the eventual
agreement against segregation reached by eight Justices disposed of the
constitutional question, Reed's assent was crucial to the practical
outcome of the case. White racial hegemony was built on a foundation
of segregated schools that Southern loyalists vowed to violently defend.73
The Justices in the majority understood that even a single dissent could
ignite "racial warfare" 74 by injecting a measure of legitimacy to that
cause. To succeed, desegregation required more than majority support.
It required unanimity. Less than ten days before the Court announced its
71. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
72. In August 1953, Reed predicted that he, then Chief Justice Fred Vinson, and
one additional unnamed Justice would vote to uphold racially segregated schools, though
he was then the only Justice known to have written a draft dissent. See JOHN D. FASSETT,
NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF STANLEY REED OF KENTUCKY 567 (1994) [hereinafter
NEW DEAL JUSTICE]; SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 593-94, 602; PATTERSON, supra
note 7, at 55, 64-65. Chief Justice Vinson had died of a heart attack in September 1953,
and was replaced by Earl Warren who came to the bench with no reservations about
striking down segregation. Warren tirelessly lobbied his colleagues, and within a short
time persuaded Justices Black and Clark, who hailed from Alabama and Texas,
respectively, to join the majority. Justice Reed was the harder sell. See SIMPLE JUSTICE,
supra note 15, at 603. Despite Warren's admiral pursuit of unanimity in Brown, his
legacy is tarnished by the role he played in implementing the federal government's
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II while he served as Attorney
General of California. See generally Sumi Cho: Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of
Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C.L. REv. 73
(1988).
73. See CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 648 ("There will be serious
incidents and some violence if the Court holds segregation unlawful.").
74. See SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 603.
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decision Reed changed his vote.75 What ultimately inspired Reed is
therefore responsible for the final unanimous outcome in Brown.
76
Strong personal, philosophical, and pragmatic convictions anchored
Reed's proposed dissent in Brown. First, Reed was a segregationist who
could not reconcile a vote favoring desegregation with his own racial
priorities.77 Second, given his conservative legal philosophy, Reed
hesitated to overrule a century of precedent that confirmed the authority
of individual states to segregate access to public facilities, particularly
when the Constitution itself authorized Congress, and not the Court in his
view, to establish a nationwide policy on race.78 Third, Reed rightly
understood that a decision to strike down segregated schools could
provoke a violent Southern backlash beyond the capacity of the Court to
restrain. 79  This Part examines the depth and dimensions of Reed's
75. See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
76. Though Justice Reed has been overlooked for the most part in the historical
literature, he has received increased scholarly attention in recent years. This Article
nonetheless remains the only piece of legal scholarship to thoroughly consider how the
Cold War influenced Reed's judicial philosophy and approach to desegregation. John D.
Fassett, Justice Reed's law clerk during the 1953-54 term, authored the only biography
dedicated exclusively to the life of Justice Reed, and one of two law review articles, other
than the instant piece, that spotlights Reed's pivotal role in Brown. See NEW DEAL
JUSTICE, supra note 72; see also John D. Fassett, Mr. Justice Reed and Brown v. The
Board of Education, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY YEARBOOK (1986)
[hereinafter YEARBOOK], http://www.supremecourthistory.org/04-library/subsvolumes
/04_ci8_k.html. Stephen Ellmann addresses Reed's impact on unanimity in Brown but
makes only passing reference to the foreign policy considerations impacting his final
vote. See Ellmann, supra note 15, at 760. In 2004, four law clerks who served at the
Court when Brown was decided, including Fassett, participated in a roundtable discussion
commemorating the 50th anniversary of the decision. The event is recounted in John D.
Fassett et. al., Supreme Court Law Clerks' Recollections of Brown v. Board of Education,
78 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 515 (2004) [hereinafter Recollections]. Upon his death in 1980,
the Kentucky Law Journal dedicated a commemorative volume to the life of Justice Reed
that included contributions from several Supreme Court Justices and one former law
clerk. See Bennett Boskey, Justice Reed and His Family of Law Clerks, 69 KY. L.J. 869
(1981); William J. Brennan, Jr., Tribute to Mr. Justice Reed, 69 KY. L.J. 717 (1981);
Warren E. Burger, Stanley Reed, 69 KY. L.J. 711 (1981); Potter Stewart, Stanley Forman
Reed, 69 KY. L.J. 719 (1981); see also Morgan D.S. Prickett, Stanley Forman Reed:
Perspectives on a Judicial Epitaph, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 343 (1981). Historical
sources on Justice Reed include F. WILLIAM O'BRIEN, JUSTICE REED AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE RELIGION CLAUSES (1958);, F. William O'Brien, Mr. Justice Reed and
Democratic Pluralism, 45 GEO. L.J. 364 (1957); Lewis C. Green, Mr. Justice Reed, 7 ST.
LOUIS BAR J. 17 (1957); Mr. Justice Reed-Swing Man or Not?, 1 STAN. L. REv. 714
(1949) [hereinafter Swing Man].
77. See infra notes 80-113 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 115-37 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 138-54 and accompanying text.
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commitment to racially segregated schools to show that his racial
ideology, judicial philosophy and pragmatic concerns predictably should
have led him to side with the South.
A. Breaking Rank
Reed was a segregationist. His proposed dissent in Brown
attempted to forestall the inevitable breakdown of racial hegemony in the
South. Accustomed to the confined company of Whites, the prospect of
desegregation conflicted with Reed's "personal prejudices and deeply
held beliefs about proper social relations." 80 Though three years at Yale
and a brief stint in Paris expanded his worldview, his experiences there
were pressed between a traditional Kentucky upbringing and a
longstanding career among the White power elite in Washington, D.C.81
As a Justice, he refused to temper his racial convictions despite the
tension and embarrassment this sometimes caused the Court. He
declined to address Black workers by their last name, a courtesy he
apparently extended to Whites, 82 and when the Court proposed to open
its annual holiday party to Black employees, Reed refused to attend.83
Incidents like these earned Reed a reputation for being "thick headed,"
"ruthless," and "anti-black.
8 4
That these convictions distanced Reed from the majority's position
in Brown is not surprising given the impact of race on his judicial record
up to that point. In 1947, Reed recused himself from pivotal housing
discrimination cases reportedly because he owned property subject to a
restrictive covenant prohibiting future sales to non-Whites.85 In 1949,
legal observers described him as "markedly insensitive" to civil rights
claims. 86 His frustration with the Court's emerging liberalism peaked in
80. Finkelman, supra note 7, at 1009.
81. See NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 10-15.
82. Id. at 559.
83. Id. at 560. This episode is also recounted in BERNARD SCHWARTZ & STEPHEN
LESHER, INSIDE THE WARREN COURT 69 (1983); JOSEPH P. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF
FELIX FRANKFURTER 334-36 (1975).
84. See NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 359; SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY-
VOL. 3. THE WASHINGTON YEARS 262 (1984).
85. See NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 444-47 (discussing Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948)). Justices Jackson
and Rutledge also recused themselves for the same reason. See CONFERENCE
DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 698.
86. See Swing Man, supra note 76, at 723. Even after Brown, Reed's civil rights
record continued to earn "one of the very lowest liberal ratings." See O'Brien, supra note
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1952 when it upheld a federal statute that banned segregation in
Washington, D.C. restaurants.87 Reed begrudgingly sided with the
majority based on principles of statutory construction but regretted
having to cast a vote that ultimately allowed "a Negro" to walk "right
into the restaurant [and] sit down and eat at the table right next to Mrs.
Reed. 8
8
When Reed did vote in favor of desegregation, he did so in narrow
circumstances based on the separate but equal doctrine, canons of
statutory interpretation, or Dormant Commerce Clause rules that
prohibited obstructions to interstate trade. 89  This strategy carefully
preserved the racial hierarchy that ordered Southern society. It served
White economic interests by making room for sporadic and transitory
interracial exchanges, but stabilized legal impediments to more lasting or
intimate Black and White relations. 90
Reed's personal investment in White supremacy made it impossible
for him to acknowledge the racist ideology underlying segregation. This
set him apart from his more progressive colleagues. In his first judicial
conference discussing Brown, Justice Warren stated: "The more I read
and hear and think, the more I come to conclude that the basis of the
principle of segregation and separate but equal rests upon the basic
premise that the Negro race is inferior.... If oral argument proved
anything, the arguments of Negro counsel proved that they are not
76, at 364. These sources are discussed in NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 646,
651.
87. See District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
88. NEw DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 560-61; see also SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra
note 15, at 595.
89. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla.
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Bd.
of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373
(1946); Ry. Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Mitchell v. United
States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.,
303 U.S. 552 (1938). Though Reed's adherence to the separate but equal doctrine was
unwavering, several Justices urged during their discussion of these cases that the Court
take more aggressive action. In McLaurin and Sweatt, for example, Justice Douglas
favored overruling Plessy outright, while Justice Black was willing to abandon the
separate but equal rule in the specific context of graduate schools. See CONFERENCE
DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 639-40, 642-43. Though Sweatt and McLaurin are
generally understood to have created an exception to the separate but equal doctrine in
the context of higher education, the Justices intended only to reaffirm the rule from
Plessy. See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
90. See JIM CROW, supra note 15, at 222-23.
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viw92 a i utc itninferior." 9' Justice Douglas seconded that view, as did Justice Minton,
who saw segregation as the South's "invidious" response to abolition and
a substitute means for Whites to degrade Blacks in the absence of
slavery. 93 "The only justification for segregation is the inferiority of the
Negro," he stated. Neither could Justice Black escape that "the reason
for segregation is the belief that Negroes are inferior," that its purpose "is
to discriminate on account of color., 94  His brief but notorious
membership in the Alabama Ku Klux Klan prior to joining the Court
surely provided him this insight.95
Racial segregation repulsed even the Court's more politically
detached members. Though Justice Jackson purported during conference
that he did not "know the effect of segregation, or the reason for it," he
had previously admitted to a friend that he had "no sympathy with racial
conceits which underlie segregation policies.' 96 In a draft concurrence in
Brown, he characterized the practice as "morally indefensible, ' '97 driven
by a presumption that Blacks were "inferior, illiterate, retarded or
indigent." 98  Justice Frankfurter's position on the matter likewise
evolved. As late as 1950, he refused to label segregation a "badge of
inferiority." 99  Two years later at the judicial conference in Brown,
however, Frankfurter reminded his colleagues that he worked as assistant
General Counsel for the NAACP, hired the Court's first Black law clerk,
and experienced anti-Semitism first-hand, all of which sensitized him to
the indignities of segregation. 00
The anti-racist ideology behind desegregation that surfaced in
Brown placed Justice Reed in a precarious position.' 0 ' A vote with the
91. CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 654.
92. Id. at 652, 658.
93. Id. at 653.
94. Id. at 648.
95. See ROBERT K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 89-100 (2d ed. 1997).
96. See Brown at 50, supra note 8, at 1616.
97. Id.
98. See SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 693.
99. See CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 640 (discussing McLaurin v.
Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)).
100. See id. at 650; MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 128-29 (1991).
101. Despite the rhetoric used to decry racial segregation during the judicial
conferences, the language in Brown conspicuously omits any recognition of the kinship
between segregation and White supremacy. Chief Justice Warren intentionally left
accusatory language out of the opinion in order to elicit voluntary compliance from the
South. Commentators have labeled this concession a significant failing, one that
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majority would make him complicit in the demise of a racial order he
desperately sought to preserve. Alternatively, a dissent would expose the
incongruity between Reed's own racial prejudice and the democratic
principles he was bound to uphold.
Reed solved this conundrum by reference to Plessy. The reasoning
in that case allowed Reed to manipulate his aversion to Blacks into a
neutral justification for segregation. In 1896, the Court in Plessy turned
a blind eye when a Black passenger ejected from a White train car
challenged Louisiana's segregation statute under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that it promoted the
inferiority of Blacks. If segregation "stamps the colored race with a
badge of inferiority," the Court retorted, it is "solely because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it.,"10 2 Though a statutory
exemption permitting Black servants to travel alongside White
employers laid bare the true purpose for color-coding train cars, 10 3 the
Court endorsed the lie that the legislators who drafted the statute had
acted "in good faith for the promotion of the public good, and not for the
annoyance or oppression of a particular class."' 0 4 That theme resurfaced
in Brown with the South's fabricated claim that segregation benefited
Blacks 10 5 by avoiding "special problems" associated with integrated
schools. 1
06
Reed invoked the same defense of segregation at the judicial
conference. He urged his colleagues to "start with the idea that there is a
large and reasonable body of opinion in various states that separation of
the races is for the benefit of both."' 1 7 Recalling the line of questioning
ultimately backfired and forestalled progress towards actual desegregation by allowing
racism to flourish in the guise of formally race-neutral laws. See Catherine MacKinnon,
Brown v. Board of Education, in Balkin, supra note 7, at 148-51; see also Alfred L.
Brophy, The World of Reparations: Slavery Reparations in Historical Perspective, 3 J.L.
Soc'y 105, 112 (2002) ("[O]nce state-required discrimination had been removed [by
Brown], there was much work to be done to remove the effects of past discrimination").
102. Id. at 551.
103. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 541.
104. Id. at 550.
105. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg., at 16, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 17, at 429 ("There was behind these
[segregation] acts a kindly feeling; there was behind these acts an intention to help these
people who had been in bondage."); see also Davis v. County Sch. Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337,
340 (E.D. Va. 1952) ("Maintenance of the separated systems in Virginia has not been
social despotism. .. in practice it has begotten greater opportunities for the Negro.").
106. See Br. for Appellees at 31, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 438 (1954),
reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 17, at 98.
107. See CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 649.
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he pursued during oral argument, Reed proclaimed that racial segregation
"is not done on a theory of racial inferiority, but on racial differences. It
protects people against the mixing of races."'' 0 8 Though segregation was
gradually disappearing in voting, transportation, and employment, he
reasoned, Blacks had not "thoroughly assimilated" into American
society.109 Until that time, states retained the right to police racial
boundaries within the limits of the "separate but equal" doctrine. 
10
This line of reasoning was no less tortured in 1952 than it was in
1896. Reed's professed belief that segregation avoided racial friction
ignored the social, economic, and educational disadvantages that brewed
resentment among Blacks and perpetrated a myth of Black inferiority and
undeserved entitlement among Whites. 1 ' He endorsed a state interest in
avoiding "race mixing," oblivious that the interest in preserving White
108. Id. at 656. During oral argument, Reed rhetorically asked attorney T. Justin
Moore, appearing on behalf of the state of Virginia, whether Virginia had not made a
legislative determination "[t]hat the greatest good for the greatest number is found in
segregation?" Tr. of Oral Arg., at 30, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 17, at 377. When questioning Thurgood
Marshall on the motives behind racially segregated schools in South Carolina, Reed
stated that, "I suppose there is a group of people, at least in the South, who would say that
segregation in the schools was to avoid racial friction." Tr. of Oral Arg., at 16, Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 17, at
345.
109. See CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 649.
110. In taking this position, Reed overlooked an epidemic of non-enforcement of
Plessy's separate equality standard. Throughout the South, per-pupil expenditures for
Whites exceeded expenditures for Blacks by as much as tenfold. See SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 20 (Rossell et al. eds., 2002). Funding schemes
that relied on tax revenues to support public schools added to the insult of segregation by
forcing Black parents to finance superior facilities their children could not attend. The
most glaring inequalities occurred in the Deep South, especially in states called to defend
their racial practices in Brown. Black schools in Clarendon County, South Carolina were
so abysmal that County lawyers did not even attempt to portray them as equal when the
case got to trial. See Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 531 (E.D.S.C. 1951). Two Black
schools had no water fountain. One had no desks. None had a working toilet. Black
schools in Prince Edward County offered no science, history or business preparation
course, though each was taught at the White schools, and had no gym, no shower, no
changing room, and no dining hall. See REMOVING A BADGE OF SLAVERY, THE RECORD
OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 41-43 (Whitman ed., 1992). In parts of Mississippi,
Maryland, Georgia, and Kentucky, Black schools did not even exist. Those that did were
so neglected that teachers doubled as custodians, cooks, and dishwashers. See CHARLES
T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 16,
49 (2004). Only when threatened with desegregation did Southern lawmakers allocate
funds for improving Black schools. See, e.g., Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 540 (Waring, J.,
dissenting); see also SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 578.
111. See Tr. of Oral Arg., at 16-17, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 17, at 345-46.
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purity itself inherently degraded Blacks." l2 He even ascribed a benign
motive to Southern segregationists while admitting their malicious intent
"to hold Negroes down," deprive them of "educational equipment," and
"to keep the Negro as a laborer." 113 This disingenuous attempt to justify
racial subordination proved the very sentiment Reed seemed desperate to
deny.
B. Formalizing Resistance
Reed acknowledged that racial bias colored his objectivity in
Brown.114  Yet even the ability to tame that impulse would not have
changed his position on racially segregated schools, which he considered
a matter of state sovereignty that should not be usurped by "judge-made
law."
Court watchers generally considered Reed a judicial conservative,
especially in matters involving states' rights. 1 5 He promoted this image
by publicly endorsing a firm division of authority between the judicial
and political branches of government. In a 1949 address to the American
Law Institute, Reed offered this justification of narrow statutory
interpretation over a more accommodating judicial posture:
There is an elemental principle, a postulate, of judicial decision. This is
that the judiciary is to declare the law and not make it. It is more sound and
true than most legal aphorisms. It properly defines the federal judicial
power in relation to the precise and clear-cut elements of a statute.
116
This same philosophy informed Reed's gradualist approach to
constitutional adjudication which prioritized existing government order
112. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
113. See CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 649.
114. Id. at 655. Reed stated during the judicial conference: "I am trying to
approach this question without past prejudices. I want to work this out in the best way."
Id.
115. See, e.g., THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969,
2388 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969) (labeling Reed a "civil rights
conservative"); John P. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 194 7-48, 16 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1, 1 (1948) (describing Reed's civil liberties record as "unusually conservative").
When nominated to the bench, Justice Reed's supporters tailored their predictions of his
judicial philosophy to appeal to their constituents. Then Senator Sherman Minton, who
would later join the Court as a Truman appointee, described Reed as a "liberal and a good
lawyer." Senator Tom Connally of Texas labeled him an "accomplished lawyer of the
conservative type." Id.; see also KEviN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON
RACE 119 (2004).
116. NEw DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 654.
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over claims of individual rights."' i Leary of radical social change, Reed
preferred an entrenched governmental power structure, leaving the
legislative branch to tinker with the status quo. 18 In 1985, Henry
Abrahamson wrote of Justice Reed:
[O]bservers generally label him as being far more of a judicial conservative
than a liberal on the bench-probably because, 'opposed to government by
judges,' he moved more slowly and cautiously than his colleagues on the
frontiers of constitutional change, and because he was reluctant to ride with
his more liberal associates in their escalating rulings that favored
individuals vis-A-vis government.
119
Reed's hostility to "government by judges," or "krytocracy" as he
called it, meant with regard to segregated schools that the Court "should
not move to change the law. If there is to be change, Congress should do
it."'120 So far as Reed was concerned, the "bare words" of the Fourteenth
Amendment were too ambiguous to support a judicial conclusion that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibited racial segregation. 121 Even stretching
the text to reach that interpretation would not give the Court authority to
act. During oral argument, Reed pressed Assistant Attorney General Lee
Rankin on the limits of judicial power, seeking to understand how the
Court could intervene when the Fourteenth Amendment expressly
empowered Congress to legislate a national policy on race. 122 Absent
117. See THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, supra
note 115, at 2388; see also NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 647.
118. A 1950 speech in Mason County, Kentucky captures Reed's philosophy of
ordered government:
In dealing with the government... changes follow only from general acceptance
of their need. The first essential of progress is law and order. Unless necessity
demands revolutionary changes, reason and sound judgment depart from the land
that seeks improvement in turmoil and recrimination. Democratic government
requires law and order as the basic essential of operation.
Id. at 489.
119. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 217 (2d ed. 1985). At the Court's memorial
service commemorating Reed's passing in 1980, then Chief Justice Burger recalled
Reed's philosophy that "a Court entrusted with the great power of judicial review should
not confuse its role with the role and function of the political branches of the
Government." See NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 656.
120. CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 656.
121. See Tr. of Oral Arg., at 35, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 17, at 536.
122. See Tr. of Oral Arg., at 14-15, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 17, at 462-63. Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to pass "appropriate legislation" to prevent
states from denying individuals "equal protection of the law." See U.S. CONST. amend.
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federal action to that effect, Reed thought, the matter devolved entirely to
the States.1
2 3
Precedent was on his side. Segregated schools had survived judicial
scrutiny in state and federal court since the end of the Civil War, thirty
years before Plessy approved the "separate but equal" doctrine. 124 Since
that time, Congress had repeatedly declined to pass anti-segregation
legislation 125 and by 1954, twenty-one states and the District of
Columbia officially endorsed the practice. 126 Even those Justices
appalled by racial segregation conceded that precedent backed the
South. 
27
Two 1950 decisions resulting in Court ordered integration
confirmed as much. When the Court in Sweatt v. Painter28 forced the
University of Texas Law School to admit its first Black student, it did so
based on the inexcusable disparities between the state's White and Black
law schools. 129 Though the decision referenced the "inherent" inequality
XIV.
123. See CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 649, 655.
124. See, e.g., Graham v. Bd. of Educ., 114 P.2d 313 (Kan. 1941); Dameron v.
Bayless, 126 P. 273 (Ariz. 1912); Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 78 P. 455 (Okla.
1904); Wong Him v. Callahan, 119 F. 381 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1902); People ex rel. Cisco v.
Sch. Bd., 56 N.E. 81 (N.Y. 1900); Martin v. Bd. of Educ., 26 S.E. 348 (W. Va. 1896);
Chrisman v. Mayor of Brookhaven, 12 So. 458 (Miss. 1893); Lehew v. Brummell, 15
S.W. 765 (Mo. 1890); Maddox v. Neal, 45 Ark. 121 (1885); United States v. Buntin, 10
F. 730 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882); Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874); State ex rel. Stoutmeyer
v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342 (1872); State ex rel. Games v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1871);
Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850).
125. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81
VA. L. REv. 947, 986-89 (1995); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern
Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REv. 213, 252-53 (1991).
126. Seventeen states required racial segregation in public schools: Alabama,
Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi,
Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
West Virginia. Four states gave local school districts the option of segregating students:
Arizona, Kansas, New Mexico and Wyoming. See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A
BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 277 (1997).
127. See CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 653-59.
128. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
129. See CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 642. Sweatt was admitted to
the Texas State University for Negroes, a facility temporarily housed in a basement near
the state capitol in Austin while permanent facilities for Blacks were being constructed in
Houston. The discrepancies between the Black and White law schools were staggering.
At the University of Texas, nineteen faculty members taught 850 White students. The
library contained 65,000 volumes. The school offered law review experience and had a
reputation as an established institution. At the Texas State University for Negroes, five
professors taught twenty-three Black students. Its library held 16,500 volumes. It did not
have a law review, and it was unaccredited. Only one of its graduates was admitted to
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of segregated schools, 130 notes from the judicial conference clarify the
Court's limited intent to order integration solely because Texas did not
provide a comparable legal education to Blacks. 3'
Similar concerns compelled the Court in McLaurin v. Oklahoma'
32
to enjoin graduate school officials from requiring the sole Black student
to sit at a desk outside the main classroom, study on the mezzanine floor
of the library, and eat in the cafeteria at a time and table away from
White students. According to the Court, such humiliating conditions
made it impossible for McLaurin to obtain an education "equal" to his
White peers. 133  Rather than limit Oklahoma's authority to operate
segregated institutions, the decision merely held that a Black student
already admitted to a White school was entitled to all the benefits and
privileges enjoyed by White students. 134
Justice Reed therefore approached Brown with an understanding
that Sweatt and McLaurin affirmed the holding of earlier desegregation
cases that tested exclusionary admission policies against the requirement
of separate equality. 35  Sweatt and McLaurin both involved Black
students selectively denied educational benefits afforded to Whites.
Neither case questioned the constitutionality of racially segregated
institutions that provided separate equality. 136 Justice Reed impressed
the state bar. See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 632-34.
130. See id. at 632-34
131. See CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 654-58.
132. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950), a third
case decided the same day as Sweatt and McLaurin, outlawed racial segregation in
railway dining cars. The Southern Railway Company had adopted a policy of restricting
Black passengers to an area behind a drawn curtain and moveable partition. Though
Henderson involved the interpretation of a congressional statute, the Court cited
McLaurin to emphasize that the separation in both cases furthered no other purpose than
to invidiously emphasize the inferior status of Blacks. Id. at 825.
133. See McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641-42; see also CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra
note 18, at 640.
134. During the judicial conference on McLaurin, Frankfurter emphasized the
"circumstances of [McLaurin's] admission" without stating whether he would have
forced the University to admit him if an "equal" Black school was available. Id. Minton
said that once admission is granted, "it must be on an equal footing." Id. Reed took a
similar view, asking rhetorically: "When you admit a person to school, should he have
full freedom? You must admit him on an equal basis." Id. at 639.
135. See Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
136. Though Brown cited Sweatt and McLaurin as authority for finding that racially
segregated public schools were "inherently unequal," the understanding in 1950 was that
neither case meant to outlaw segregation. As one commentator observed, "[t]he intention
of the words and the intention of the author did not necessarily square." See Whitman,
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this point on Thurgood Marshall during oral argument in Brown. 137
For Reed, nothing in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment,
any act of Congress, or the Court's judicial precedent supported a vote
favoring segregation. Absent the controlling weight of personal
prejudice, the Court's own precedent precluded the professed anti-
krytocrat from initially supporting desegregation.
C. Confronting "Racial Warfare"
As described above, Reed could not reconcile a decision to strike
down segregation with his own racial convictions or judicial precedent.
Had he been able to do so, the Court's inability to enforce such a ruling
provided a third reason Reed proposed a dissent in Brown.
Nowhere was desegregation more of a threat to White racist
orthodoxy than in the public schools. Friendships there, among eager
and experimental adolescents, had the potential to cross the color line,
making way for interracial romance and sexual intimacy. This taboo
fueled the region's panicked opposition to Black civil rights and
desegregation even prior to Brown.1 38  Save for bans on interracial
marriage, separate Black and White schools were the White South's best
defense against supposed racial annihilation. 
139
Prior to 1954, the Court strategized to limit the South's opposition
to forward-looking judicial decisions on race. It did so by controlling
internal procedures, carefully selecting its docket, and narrowly tailoring
the scope of desegregation opinions. On more than one occasion, the
Court enlisted Justice Reed to author controversial desegregation
opinions hoping that the delivery from a Southern segregationist would
assuage the region's hostility. 40 Cases that struck down segregation in
supra note 110, at 112. Even if Sweatt and McLaurin were read to abolish segregation in
post-secondary educational institutions, their particularly narrow holding did not prohibit
segregation in public elementary or high schools.
137. See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 25-26, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, reprinted
in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 17, at 473-74.
138. See RENEE C. ROMANO, RACE MIXING: BLACK-WHITE MARRIAGE IN POSTWAR
AMERICA 192 (2003).
139. For a contemporaneous example of segregationist rhetoric linking public
school desegregation with interracial sex and "mongrelization," see THEODORE GILMORE
BILBO, TAKE YOUR CHOICE: SEPARATION OR MONGRELIZATION (1947).
140. For example, when the Court forced political parties in Texas to open primary
elections to Black voters in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), Justice Jackson
successfully petitioned Chief Justice Stone to reassign the opinion writing to Justice Reed
after it had been given to Justice Frankfurter. Jackson feared the repercussions of having
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public transportation or business establishments had cross-racial appeal
because they served the economic interests of Whites. Other decisions,
like Sweatt and McLaurin, applied only when "equal" opportunities were
not available. Even then, the Court limited its holding to institutions of
higher education, careful in both cases not to interfere with racial
segregation in the more volatile environment of public schools.
Moreover, because relatively few Blacks pursued post-secondary
education compared to Whites when Sweatt and McLaurin were decided,
neither decision threatened to upend the psychological or economical
advantage Whites held over Blacks either in or outside of the classroom.
The resulting interracial contacts among adults in a graduate classroom,
bus terminal, or coffee shop simply would not destabilize the existing
racial hierarchy in the same way as massive desegregation among
hormonally charged youths. Public schools were different.141
Desegregated grade schools were so pregnant with possibilities
unacceptable to the South that Whites lashed out against Blacks even
before Brown got to trial. Throughout the region, Blacks were
discharged from employment, denied bank credit, chased out of town,
and beaten and killed by a resurgent Klan. 142  Even Blacks having
absolutely no involvement with the desegregation campaign faced
retribution. 43  Southern lawmakers actively instigated violence by
challenging the Court's authority and proclaiming their own intent to
obstruct desegregation should the Court rule against them.144 Even many
Reed speak for the Court because he was Jewish. He reasoned that the decision, "bound
to arouse bitter resentment, will be much less apt to stir ugly reactions if the news that the
white primary is dead, is broke to it, if possible, by a Southerner who has been a
Democrat and is not a member of one of the minorities which stir prejudices kindred to
those against the Negro." See NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 361-62; see also
MCMAHON, supra note 115, at 154. Reed was also assigned an opinion that struck down
a Virginia statute mandating racial segregation on interstate busses. See Morgan v.
Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
141. See Whitman, supra note 110, at 168; see also CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS,
supra note 18, at 659.
142. See OGLETREE, supra note 45, at 4; SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 303.
143. See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST
SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950, 112 (1987).
144. See CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 648, 659 n.70 (discussing
statements of South Carolina governor James F. Byrnes); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, 158-59
(1994). This rabid opposition became even more pronounced after the Court announced
its decision in Brown L During oral arguments in the remedial phase of Brown II, S.
Emory Rogers, arguing the case for South Carolina, acknowledged bluntly that White
citizens of Clarendon County "would not send our white children to the Negro schools."
SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 734-35; J. HARVIE WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE,
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Southern district court judges, schooled in the racist tradition of their
homeland, were presumed ready to betray their constitutional obligations
in order to preserve segregation.1
45
Making matters worse, federal support for desegregation all but
evaporated when Dwight D. Eisenhower succeeded Harry Truman as
President while the Court continued to debate Brown.146  Though
Eisenhower authorized the Department of Justice to submit a
supplemental Brief in support of desegregation, his attorney general
asked the Court to outlaw segregation without in fact requiring the South
to immediately dismantle segregated schools. 147  The fateful "all
deliberate speed" standard proposed by the Administration discouraged
enforcement and positioned the South to stall the pace and progress of
actual change. 148  If this did not make clear the new administration's
THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION 63 (1993). Attorneys for Alabama,
Arkansas, Georgia, and Virginia all threatened to shut down the public schools, repeal
compulsory attendance laws, or take other measures to subvert Brown if segregation was
abolished. See CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 665-66; SIMPLE JUSTICE,
supra note 15, at 736. See also WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., BRowN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION:
A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 31 (1980) (noting that the Justices "perceived the
depth of white racist attachment to Jim Crow."). These developments prompted Justice
Frankfurter's remark during the judicial conference on Brown II that "nothing would be
worse... than for this court to make an abstract declaration that segregation is bad and
then have it evaded by tricks." SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 574.
145. See CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 665. n. 85. Justice Black
lamented that the Court had "no more chance to enforce [desegregation] in the Deep
South than to enforce Prohibition in New York City." Id.
146. See COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 130. Unlike President
Eisenhower, President Truman pursued a broad racial equality agenda that was driven by
moral incentives as well as a need to court the increasingly powerful Black vote. See
BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 137 (1997); Philip Elman, interviewed by Norman Silber, The
Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960:
An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 818 (1987). Truman bypassed predictable
opposition in Congress by using his executive authority to achieve civil rights gains for
Blacks, including desegregating the armed forces and creating the Commission on Civil
Rights. He pledged federal support for equal rights initiatives in an address at the
NAACP's national convention and famously instigated the Dixiecrat defection when he
endorsed a 1948 Democratic Party platform that supported equal rights for Blacks. See
ROSSELL, supra note 110, at 21.
147. See Supplemental Br. for the United States on Reargument as Amicus Curiae
at 182-87, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 17, at 1048-53.
148. See OGLETREE, supra note 45, at 11 ("The Courts' reluctance to take a more
forceful position on ending segregation immediately played into the hands of the
integration opponents").
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tepid commitment to Black civil rights, 149 Eisenhower himself surely did.
Just before Brown was decided, Eisenhower explained to Chief Justice
Warren at a White House dinner that Southern segregationists were not
bad people, "[a]ll they are concerned about is to see that their sweet little
girls are not required to sit in school alongside some big, black bucks.,
150
These developments caused Justice Reed and the rest of his
colleagues significant trepidation about the impact of Brown. Reed was
present when Justice Clark predicted "violence" and "troubles" from a
desegregation ruling,15 1 which Justice Black warned would put the Court
on the "battle front" of a war with the States. 152 One account has Black
warning that "[t]he guys who talked nigger would be in charge ....
There would be riots, the Army might have to be called out. ' 153 When
contemplating the constitutional status of segregation, Reed openly
questioned how the Court could implement a desegregation decree and
curb the South's reaction. Though he hoped that schools in the border
region would serve as examples, he knew the inevitability of revolt in the
Deep South.
154
D. Closing Ranks
Motivated by a racist ideology, avowed judicial conservatism, and
the prospect of vicious Southern defiance, Reed staked out a position
favoring public school segregation. After "extended intellectual
turmoil,"' 155 however, Reed changed his vote, siding with the majority to
overturn established precedent in a move that subordinated states' rights
to the President's political agenda. The only explanation Reed expressly
provided for his conversion is found in a memo to Justice Frankfurter
written shortly after Brown. It states simply that the many considerations
149. Eisenhower never publicly endorsed Brown and privately stated that
desegregation would lead to social disintegration. PATTERSON, supra note 7, at 80-82;
STEPHEN AMBROSE, EISENHOWER: SOLDIER AND PRESIDENT 367-68 (1990).
150. See CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 655, n. 60; SCHWARTZ &
LESHER, supra note 83, at 87; see also EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN
291 (1977).
151. See CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 659.
152. Id. at 648.
153. PATTERSON, supra note 7, at 54. The threat of a backlash was significant
enough that during the debates in Brown, Justices Clark, Burton, and Jackson each
conditioned their vote on a promise of gradual enforcement. See CONFERENCE
DISCUSSIONS, supra note 18, at 652-53, 659.
154. Id. at 649.
155. NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 657.
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favoring segregation "did not add up to a balance against the Court's
opinion," and that "the factors looking toward fair treatment for Negroes
are more important than the weight of history."
'' 56
This statement fails to explain adequately Reed's vote against
segregated schools. There is no indication that Reed awoke to the moral
outrage of segregation, and well into retirement he insisted that pre-
Brown judicial opinions supported the South. History also proved him
right on the difficulties of enforcement given the ferocity of Southern
opposition. By all accounts, Reed changed his vote without ever
abandoning these sentiments. There is, however, one constant in Reed's
judicial record that trumped his commitment to segregation, deference to
stare decisis, and pragmatic doubts about the institutional limitations of
the Court: a steadfast commitment to national security. At the height of
the Cold War, Reed's vote favoring desegregation fit neatly into that
paradigm.
IV. Global Exigencies and the Pursuit of Democratic Authenticity
The foreign policy implications of America's racial policies
trumped every motivation Reed had for supporting segregated schools.
The historical record bares this out. First, Reed investigated the status of
racial segregation across the globe to determine whether the legal
standing of Blacks in America conformed to international norms. 15
7
Conceding the importance of cultivating goodwill among developing
nations, Reed knew that desegregation would promote America's
reputational standing and military dominance. Second, though a
segregationist, Reed had previously voted to strike down state
segregation statutes that jeopardized national priorities. 158 Third, despite
his asserted judicial conservatism, Reed established a record of aligning
his votes with the foreign policy objectives of the Executive Branch.1 59
Cold War anxiety ultimately infused Reed's nationalist philosophy in a
way that likely made him receptive to the national security concerns
proffered by the NAACP, the Department of Justice, and the supporting
amici in Brown. From this perspective, the Cold War provided the
conditions for unanimity in the case.
156. YEARBOOK, supra note 76; NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 577.
157. See infra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
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A. Cold War Anxieties
Brown does not expressly characterize desegregation as a Cold War
imperative. The decision nonetheless patently advanced the Nation's
quest for democratic idealism and communist containment. In Brown,
the Court acknowledged "the importance of education to our democratic
society," emphasizing that it "is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. 160
Education, it said, "is the very foundation of good citizenship." 161 This
rhetoric harmonized public school desegregation with two key strategies
for winning the Cold War. It authenticated American democracy by
formalizing equal treatment as a component of "good citizenship" and
maximized participation in the United States military.
62
These strategic benefits of public school desegregation would have
assuaged Reed's anxiety over the possibility of communist invasion.
Reed's participation in World War I sensitized him to the need for a
strong military and by mid-century, the precarious outcome of the
Rosenberg trials, the conspiracy conviction of Communist leader Eugene
Dennis, and the on-going McCarthy investigations exposed democracy's
weak-points. 163  Reed's 1952 vote in the famous Youngstown Steel
Seizure Case confirms that he contemplated Brown in the grips of anti-
communist apprehension.164
In Youngstown, Reed sided against the majority in voting to
recognize President Truman's authority to seize domestic steel mills to
ensure a continuous supply of arms and ammunition to American troops
defending South Korea against communist aggression. America's
involvement in foreign hostilities, as the dissent understood, constituted
part of a broader effort to arrest communist advancement before it
160. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
161. Id.
162. The Court recently cited these same objectives as a justification for upholding
diversity-based admissions programs in colleges and universities. See Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 330 (O'Connor, J.) (noting support for affirmative action among "high ranking"
military officers and civilian leaders who consider a "highly qualified, racially diverse
officer corps ... essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide
national security"); id. at 331 (affirming the importance of "preparing students for work
and citizenship," and the role of education in "sustaining our political and cultural
heritage" (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982))).
163. See Correspondence with John D. Fassett (on file with the author); see also
NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 502 ("In each of the key cold-war cases, Justice
Reed was firmly among the group supporting governmental powers and action.").
164. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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breached the continent. The Soviet Union, the dissent pointed out,
maintained "the largest air force in the world and ... ground forces
much larger than those [] available to the United States and [its
allies]. 165  America's military shortcomings made the transnational
effort to repel invasion an exercise "in self-preservation through mutual
security."'
166
Along with his colleagues in dissent, Reed feared that communist
expansion had brought the world within a half-step of obliteration. "A
world not yet recovered from the devastation of World War II has been
forced to face the threat of another and more terrifying global conflict,"
the dissent forewarned. 167 How the community of nations responded to
that threat would "dramatically influence the lives of many generations
of the world's peoples yet unborn."'
168
These statements, published after notice of appeal had been filed in
Brown, and just seven days before the Court consolidated arguments in
the case,169 confirm that Reed would have calculated the strategic costs
of racial segregation on the Nation's investment in world stability. Two
months after Youngstown, Reed instructed his law clerk, John D. Fassett,
to investigate whether the United States' treatment of Blacks conformed
to international practice. 170 Reed himself had researched the matter as
early as 1945 when he concluded that a global consensus had emerged
against slavery and in favor of universal suffrage but that nothing in the
relevant international conventions or domestic laws of other countries
prohibited "separate but equal access" to public facilities.' 7 ' Reed re-
165. Id. at 669 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 670. Youngstown continues to shape the scope of Presidential authority,
as can be seen in cases involving the Bush Administration's policy towards alleged
"enemy combatants" and the treatment of prisoners held by the U.S. military in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Khalid v.
Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005); Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F.Supp.2d 678 (D.S.C.
2005); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004). For the historiography
of Youngstown, see MAEVA MARcus, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE, THE LIMITS
OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977).
167. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 668 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 670.
169. On June 9, 1952, the Supreme Court consolidated the appeals pending from
Kansas and South Carolina. See Briggs v. Elliot, 72 S. Ct. 1078 (1952); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 72 S. Ct. 1070 (1952). On October 12, 1952, the Court consolidated the two final
appeals from Virginia and Delaware. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 344 U.S. 1 (1952).
Youngstown was decided on June 2, 1952. This procedural history of Brown is recounted
in COTrROL, supra note 45, at 139.
170. See NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 566-67.
171. See id. at 561; see also YEARBOOK, supra note 76.
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examined that conclusion in 1952 after joining Youngstown's apocalyptic
dissent and hearing oral arguments in Brown.
Though reluctant to tailor domestic constitutional standards to
international norms, Reed admitted that "the attitudes of the rest of the
world toward segregation is worthy of consideration. ' 1 2  To better
understand the "attitude of other nations on that subject," Reed had
Fassett locate "any expression by any official representative of any
country" or the United Nations regarding the legal status of
segregation. 173  Fassett's biography of Justice Reed does not identify
what material he uncovered. But Reed already knew that at least some
countries had moved to outlaw racial segregation. 174  International
considerations continued to cause Reed "much thought" even after he
filed a draft dissent in January 1954.175 Over the next several weeks,
Fassett pressed the political advantages of desegregation, and on May 7,
Chief Justice Warren visited Reed's chambers to ask rhetorically whether
he thought a fractured decision was "really the best thing for the
country."' 176 Brown was announced ten days later, with Reed's vote
against segregation making it a unanimous opinion.
B. Forward March
The Cold War vulnerabilities articulated in Youngstown's dissent
tested Reed's segregationist philosophy and deference to states' rights
when he contemplated the constitutionality of racially segregated
schools. Under less foreboding circumstances, Reed had used his
position as a Justice to promote national domestic interests despite his
professed aversion to "judge made law." Certainly then, Reed would
have prioritized America's foreign policy objectives over his
commitment to legislative deference and respect for the sovereignty of
individual states.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See, e.g., Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 39 n.16 (1948)
(acknowledging 1944 Racial Discrimination Act enacted by Province of Ontario).
175. See YEARBOOK, supra note 76; NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 571.
176. Richard Kluger suggests that it was Chief Justice Warren who persuaded
Justice Reed during this meeting to join the rest of his colleagues in striking down
racially segregated schools. See SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 702. Fassett recounts
a different version of events, proposing that Justice Reed decided to abandon his dissent
as early as December of 1953, after the two had discussed the implications of racial
segregation on the nation's position in the Cold War. See Recollections, supra note 76, at
555; NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 572.
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Though tagged as "a civil rights conservative,"'' 7  Reed's voting
pattern more accurately places him among the less "judicious" of his
contemporaries on the bench. 78 Douglas described Reed as "one of the
most reactionary judges" of his time. 7 9  Frankfurter called him
"unjudicial minded" 180 and launched a personal crusade to tame his
judicial activism. Among the many correspondences Frankfurter
delivered to Reed on the primacy of legislative deference was a memo
entitled "Footnote on objectivity," that warned: "[P]recisely because it is
so easy to make one's own necessarily limited personal experience with
affairs the yardstick of the constitutional power of governments, a Justice
must have humility .... in not unconsciously arrogating to one's own
notions of policy the commands of the Constitution."' 81 At best, Reed's
judicial conservatism wavered.
Though disinclined to interfere with the sovereign prerogatives of
individual states, Reed's activism peaked when state legislation clashed
with federal objectives. In those circumstances, Reed reflexively
engaged the power of the Court to advance overarching priorities, even
before federal lawmakers articulated a national policy by pre-empting
state law. Reed's initial conference vote to strike down a California
market regulation in the absence of a federally mandated commercial
standard drew this acerbic response from Frankfurter:
I cannot rid myself of the conviction that all your difficulties in the [case]
derives [sic] from your conviction that such state controls... are bad
economics and bad for the country.... You may be right as a statesman-
but it's none of your damn business as a judge construing [the Constitution
and] you must restrict yourself to your modest but ample scope of
authority. 1
82
By 1954, it was not uncommon for the Court to advance national
priorities against the States when Congress declined to do so through
federal legislation. This approach came to dominate the Court's post-
1945 Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence which Reed himself
177. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
178. By his own admission, Reed thought it imprudent to rule on the merits of a
case without considering broader consequences in situations not immediately presented to
the Court. See NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 351; LASH, supra note 83, at 205.
179. See NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 379.
180. Id.; see also FINE, supra note 84, at 159 (discussing Frankfurter's perception
of Reed's judicial philosophy).
181. See NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 351; LASH, supra note 83, at 188.
182. See NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 348 (discussing Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
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championed in Morgan v. Virginia183 to void a state segregation statute
that applied to interstate busses.' 84  Morgan reflected a judicial
compromise between the laissez-faire absolutism initiated under Chief
Justice Fuller and the unwavering legislative deference shown by the
early Roosevelt Court.185 In 1945, Chief Justice Stone announced that
when faced with congressional inaction, it was "[the] Courts, and not the
state legislature, [which] is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of
the competing demands of state and national interests."' 86  Morgan
confirmed as much. Justice Reed explained that Congress had ultimate
authority under the Constitution to prohibit state segregation statutes that
burdened interstate trade. When Congress failed to act, however, the
183. 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
184. Other examples include Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950);
Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
185. Both Courts recognized Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause to
exposit national commercial policy, but gave radically different interpretations to
congressional silence. The Fuller Court established a baseline of implicit disapproval
whenever Congress declined to enact federal legislation expressly authorizing state
market regulations. Together with the emergence of the Lochner-era's substantive due
process rules, the Court's Commerce Clause cases at the time effectively
constitutionalized a free market system which tolerated little to no restraint on trade or
commerce. See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 109-10 (1890) ("[S]o long as
Congress does not pass any law to regulate [the sale of goods], or allowing the States so
to do, it thereby indicates its will that such commerce shall be free and untrammeled.");
Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 458 (1886) ("[W]here Congress has exclusive power
to regulate commerce, its non-action is equivalent to a declaration that commerce shall be
free."). In contrast, the early Roosevelt Court adopted a baseline of tacit congressional
approval by recognizing concurrent state authority over economic markets unless
expressly preempted by Congress. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 367 (1943)
("[I]n the absence of inconsistent Congressional action, [instability in California's raisin
market] is a problem whose solution is peculiarly within the province of the state.");
California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 113 (1941) ("Notwithstanding the Commerce
Clause, [market] regulation in the absence of Congressional action has, for the most part,
been left to the states by the decisions of this Court."). At the same time, the reality of
congressional inertia coupled with the dangers of economic gridlock driven by
inconsistent state regulations caused some members of the Court to reconsider its hands-
off philosophy. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he practical result [of too much deference] is that in default of action by
us, [the states] will go on suffocating and retarding and Balkanizing American commerce,
trade and industry."). Ultimately, the realists of the Roosevelt Court adopted an approach
that enabled the judiciary to strike down state regulations when it perceived an undue
burden on economic development. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769
(1945). The development of the Court's Dormant Commerce Clause cases has inspired
new scholarship in recent years. See, e.g., Cushman, supra note 24; Robert Post,
Federalism in the Taft Court Era, Can it be "Revived"?, 51 DuKE L.J. 1513 (2000);
Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U.
CHI. L. REv. 483 (1997).
186. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 769.
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burden fell on the judiciary to move in its stead.
Morgan explains how Reed could have reconciled his conservative
judicial philosophy with a desegregation decision in Brown that arrested
the general police power of Southern states. In Morgan, the Court
proclaimed judicial authority to strike down a state transportation statute
even though the Constitution expressly authorized Congress to regulate
inter-state trade under the Commerce Clause of Article I. Faced with
congressional silence in that context, Reed affirmed the Court's role in
fostering economic integration: "[B]ecause the Constitution puts the
ultimate power to regulate commerce in Congress, rather than the states,
the degree of state legislation's interference with that commerce may be
weighed by federal courts to determine whether the burden makes the
statute unconstitutional." 187  Brown implicated the same balance of
power by inviting the Court to outlaw state segregation statutes even
though the Constitution delegated race-based policy decisions to
Congress under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 188 The same
nationalist philosophy that prompted Reed to subordinate state
sovereignty to the Nation's economic security in Morgan would have
enabled him to strike down state segregation statutes that threatened the
Nation's survival in Brown. 189
C. Heeding Commands
The nationalist priorities reflected in Morgan superseded Reed's
commitment to segregation and states' rights. Reed's allegiance to the
187. Morgan, 328 U.S. at 380.
188. For a discussion of Congress' institutional capacity under section 5 in light of
the school desegregation experience, see William D. Araiza, Courts, Congress and Equal
Protection: What Brown Teaches Us About the Section 5 Power, 47 How. L.J. 199
(2004).
189. According to Michael Klarman, the Court's commerce cases reflect an
evolving willingness to protect civil rights despite adverse precedent favoring
segregation. See JIM CROW, supra note 15, at 220-22. While this might have been true
for the other Justices, there is little evidence to support that claim with respect to Justice
Reed. As Klarman himself acknowledges, none of these cases criticize Southern race
policy and each was decided under Dormant Commerce Clause principles which enabled
the Court to forbid segregation in the limited circumstance of interstate activity without
addressing more significant forms of racial discrimination in housing or education.
Moreover, Klarman's assertion is belied by other decisions during the same period that
rejected claims of racial discrimination, at least when the government claimed national
security was in issue. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115
(1943).
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Executive Branch provided additional motivation for aligning his vote in
Brown with the Nation's Cold War objectives.19 °
Reed's loyalty to the Executive department is best understood in
light of the circumstances surrounding his appointment to the bench.
The second of eight Justices appointed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
Reed's nomination in 1937 was part of a calculated strategy to
nationalize political authority and concentrate it in the office of the
President.191  At the time, Southern politicians in control of key
congressional committees blocked Depression era recovery reforms
precisely because they feared that a consolidated federal government
would undermine state authority to enforce racial segregation.' 92 Any
legislation that eked past Congress was struck down by the Hughes Court
which was comprised of jurists hostile to Roosevelt's reorganization
plans and legislative restraints on individual autonomy. Thus, the two
roadblocks to Roosevelt's "modem presidency" were Southern racial
politics and the make-up of the Court.'
93
Bulldozed by uncooperative legislators he could not depose,
Roosevelt set out to advance his agenda through the judiciary by
reconstituting a Court sympathetic to his constitutional vision-one the
Department of Justice would articulate in strategically selected
appeals.' 94 Reed was an obvious choice. Up to that point Reed had spent
his entire public career in service of the Executive Branch, capping a tour
of duty in World War I with key positions in the Hoover Administration.
In 1935, he was named Roosevelt's Solicitor General. 195 The stinging
defeats he suffered in that capacity when defending the President's
economic recovery package before the Court left a lasting impression
about the destructive power of an uncooperative judiciary.' 96 The team
190. Even commentators who described Reed as judicially conservative noted his
unyielding deference to the Executive Branch. See NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at
654.
191. See MCMAHON, supra note 115, at 107.
192. See id. at 105.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 144-76.
195. Reed served as Counsel for the Federal Farm Board and General Counsel to
the Reconstruction Finance Administration under President Herbert Hoover before being
named Roosevelt's Solicitor General. See Recollections, supra note 76, at 521.
196. See NEw DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 82-130. The New York Times
described Solicitor General Reed as "an important legal aide in forwarding and defending
the policies of the New Deal." Editorial, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 19, 1938, at 9. In that
capacity, Reed represented the United States in several pivotal cases, with mixed results.
See, e.g., Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936);
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of insiders Roosevelt assembled to formulate the administration's
response to the "economic royalists," as Roosevelt called them,' 97
included Reed, whose appointment to the bench one commentator
describes as a fallback to Congress' 1937 defeat of the "Court Packing"
plan.198 Reed's ascension to the bench, therefore, came with an implied
mandate "to buttress the modem presidency and destabilize southern
democracy."1 99
Reed was faithful to that mission, especially in times of crisis. In
1942, he took the highly unusual step of speaking publicly on behalf of
Roosevelt's war effort at a presidential re-election rally. He urged the
audience to support whatever "civil or military" plans the President
proposed to protect the Nation and its allies "against the aggressors. '"200
Reed himself put those words into practice by affirming Roosevelt's
discretion to impose curfews on persons of Japanese ancestry, including
American citizens, during World War 11.201 He did the same one year
later when Roosevelt authorized military officials to force Japanese-
Americans from their homes into internment camps.20 2 He was equally
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hopkins Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1936); Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936); United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1 (1935).
197. See NEw DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 131.
198. See MCMAHON, supra note 115, at 118-19. To balance the interminably
activist Justices dominating the Hughes Court, none of whom planned to retire in the near
future, Roosevelt proposed the "Court Packing Plan" to increase the number of Justices
serving at one time to as many as fifteen. Legislative opposition, particularly though not
exclusively from Southern senators, killed the proposal. See Cushman, supra note 24, at
46-49; NEw DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 147-61.
199. McMAHON, supra note 115, at 97-8.
200. See NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 307.
201. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States,
320 U.S. 115 (1943). For a discussion of wartime civil rights abuses against Japanese-
Americans, see PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).
202. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Forty years after being
convicted for refusing to comply with a military order to report to the internment camps,
Fred Korematsu returned to federal court pursuant to a procedural mechanism that
allowed him to renew his appeal. The presiding judge vacated his conviction, stating that
Korematsu "stands as a constant caution that in times of war or declared military
necessity our institutions must be vigilant in protecting constitutional guarantees."
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Five years later,
Congress passed the 1988 Civil Liberties Act, formally apologizing for the Japanese
internments and providing $20,000 in reparations for each surviving victim. In 1998,
Korematsu was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by President Bill Clinton for
the courage he showed opposing injustice. See Ty S. Wahab Twibell, The Road to
Internment: Special Registration and Other Human Rights Violations of Arabs and
Muslims in the United States, 29 VT. L. REv. 407, 414 n.13 (2005). Despite the universal
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solicitous when President Truman called upon the Court to outlaw
instances of racial segregation. In fact, Reed's vote favored the
Executive Branch in every racial discrimination case that Truman's
Department of Justice argued before him prior to Brown.2 °3 Both
Roosevelt and Truman justified their respective racial policies in the
name of national security.
Reed's support for the Executive Branch is especially transparent in
those cases directly implicating wartime relationships with other nations.
204 205Youngstown is one example.2 °4  Schneiderman v. United States is
another. In 1943, Congress sought to denaturalize Russian-born William
Schneiderman claiming that his communist affiliations made it
impossible for him to pledge fealty to the United States government
when he had applied for citizenship sixteen years earlier.2 °6 The dispute
tested the constitutionality of democratic loyalty oaths that made
Communist Party members ineligible for citizenship. Its resolution
placed the Court in a quandary: reject the oath and remove the Nation's
supposed first line of defense against subversive infiltration, or uphold it
and upend the budding United States/Soviet alliance the Executive
Branch had so carefully cultivated.2 °7
Writing for the majority, Justice Murphy side-stepped the tricky
constitutional issue by dismissing the government's claim for lack of
evidence regarding Schneiderman's alleged subversive activities.20 8 It
was Justice Reed, however, who is identified as having devised the
strategy for avoiding a political fire-storm and disposing of the case on
evidentiary grounds to satisfy the State Department.20 9
criticism by civil libertarians and constitutional scholars against the Japanese curfew and
internment cases, Reed continued to defend his vote in each case after retirement, stating:
"I think, even now, that the Court was entirely correct in this matter." See NEW DEAL
JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 345.
203. See Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla. State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). Reed did not
participate in Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) or Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
(1948), where the Department of Justice asked the Court to prohibit judicial enforcement
of racially discriminatory property sales transactions. See supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
205. 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
206. Id. at 120-22. Schneiderman is discussed at length in NEW DEAL JUSTICE,
supra note 72, at 356-59; see also J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: A
POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 312-16 (1968).
207. See NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 357.
208. Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 125.
209. See NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 357-58; HOWARD, supra note 206, at
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Reed's record of purposefully aligning critical decisions with the
foreign policy goals of the Executive Branch would have made him
especially receptive in Brown when the amicus coalition, particularly the
Department of Justice itself, presented Southern segregation as a
domestic affront to President Truman's national security agenda.210 The
very racial commitments that drove Southern lawmakers to reject
Roosevelt's progressive economic reforms now obstructed Truman's
Cold War campaign. Against this backdrop, Reed surely perceived the
South's defense of segregation in Brown as one more in a long line of
regional assaults against a President's agenda.21  As it was during the
Great Depression, Southern lawmakers were unilaterally risking the
Nation's survival in a selfish effort to preserve regional racial
entitlements. On this view, a dissent in Brown would compromise the
very reason Reed was named to the bench. A vote with the majority
312-13. Both the majority and dissenting opinions disclaimed any political motivation
for their respective dispositions of the case. See Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 119
(Murphy, J.) ("We agree with our brethren of the minority that our relations with Russia,
as well as our views regarding its government and the merits of Communism are
immaterial to a decision of this case."); id. at 171-72 (Stone, J., dissenting) ("[This] case
has obviously nothing to do with relations with Russia, where petitioner was born, or
with our past or present views of the Russian political or social system."). Their effort
was for the most part unconvincing. See H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX
FRANKFURTER 170 (1981) (describing Justice Frankfurter's belief that "[w]hat is plain as
a pikestaff is that the present war considerations-political considerations-are the
driving force behind the result of this case."); see also Lewis Wood, Red's Citizenship
Declared Valid by U.S. Supreme Court in 5-3 Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1943, at Al;
Editorial, Beliefs Are Personal, WASH. POST, June 24, 1943, at 12.
210. Reed's biographer writes that Reed "believed in, and deferred to the exercise
of, strong powers by the president and Congress not only pursuant to the Commerce
Clause but also under other constitutional provisions, particularly the power successfully
to prosecute war and to guard the nation against subversion." NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra
note 72, at 651. Reed himself stated, "I'm on the side of the power of the Federal
Government to use all of its energies, either to crush incitements to rebellion, or to fight a
war." Id. at 345. These statements explain the loyalty Reed may have been compelled to
show the Executive Department in Brown, even though the case did not directly involve a
question of presidential authority.
211. See MCMAHON, supra note 115, at 119. In addition to obstructing early New
Deal legislation and leading the opposition to Roosevelt's Court Packing plan, Southern
lawmakers in the 1930s killed Roosevelt's proposed anti-lynching legislation. Id. at 114-
17. Controversy over this unfortunate episode resurfaced in June 2005 when eighty-five
United States Senators passed a Joint Resolution apologizing for the Southern filibuster
against the anti-lynching bill. Though the apology received strong bipartisan support,
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist of Tennessee refused repeated requests to permit a roll-
call vote which would have forced individual senators to record their opposition. As of
June 28, 2005, fifteen Senators still refused to lend their name to the non-binding
symbolic resolution. See Scott Shepard, Frist Vetoed Roll-Call on Anti-Lynching Bill,
THE DAILY REFLECTOR (Greenville, N.C.), June 15, 2005, at 4.
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required only that he complete the job he was appointed to do-advance
an Executive agenda against a Southern blockade.212
V. From the Cold War to the War on Terror
Brown's commitment to racial equality and human dignity
legitimized the ideal of participatory governance, handing the United
States a crucial ideological advantage over the Soviet Union at the height
of the Cold War. Fifty years on, the world has welcomed ninety-eight
additional nations into the democratic camp.213 And yet stability eludes
the globe. The death of communism in the decades succeeding Brown
has given birth to rogue nations, harbored terrorists and weapons of mass
destruction that hold hostage prospects of future democratic
proliferation. 1 4 It is not surprising then to see the internationalist
worldview that captured unanimity in Brown reappear among some
Justices with the United States locked in a War on Terrorism.
A. Internationalizing Rights and Representation
The Justices who rejected the constitutionality of the Bush
Administration's detention procedures in Hamdi sought to align the
Nation's practices with a constitutional guarantee of due process which
recognizes the dignity and worth of each individual.215 Justice O'Connor
wrote of the need to "preserve our commitment at home to the principles
212. During oral arguments, Assistant Attorney Lee Rankin acknowledged the
futility of waiting for Congress to outlaw segregation: "[T]he reason why this case is here
was that action couldn't be obtained from Congress... because of the present
membership or approach of Congress to that particular question." See Tr. of Oral Arg., at
16, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra
note 17, at 527-28. Southern segregationists who held key Senate committee chairs
refused to pass legislation supported by President Truman to prohibit racial
discrimination in voting, employment, and government contracting. Truman's civil
rights achievements were thus limited to areas under executive authority that did not
require congressional approval, including desegregation of the military and the support of
the Department of Justice as amicus curiae in desegregation cases. See COLD WAR CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 82-102; Greenberg, supra note 45, at 888; see also ALONZO L.
HAMBY, LIBERALISM AND ITS CHALLENGERS: ROOSEVELT To REAGAN 65 (1985).
213. The most recent data available identifies twenty-two electoral democracies in
existence in 1950. By 2000, that number rose to 120 out of 192 existing countries. See
FREEDOM HOUSE, DEMOCRACY'S CENTURY: A SURVEY OF GLOBAL POLITICAL CHANGE IN
THE 20TH CENTURY 2 (2000).
214. See Fred Hiatt, Democracy in Trouble; Now We Understand That It's Not
Inevitable, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2004, at A2 1.
215. 542 U.S. 507 (2004); see also supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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for which we fight abroad., 21 6 Her opinion in Hamdi captures the same
internationalist philosophy that facilitated majority agreement against
segregated schools in Brown.
This was not the first time in recent years that a judicial admonition
against the deprivation of democratic liberties was guided by the lessons
of Brown. In 2005, a majority of Justices in Vieth v. Jubelirer21 7
recognized a cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause against politically gerrymandered electoral districts
that denied individual voters a fair and effective opportunity to influence
the political process. 21 8 Such tactics, Justice Kennedy explained, do not
"serve the interests of our political order. Nor should [they] be thought
to serve our interests in demonstrating to the world how democracy
works. 219
Two years earlier, the interdependence of racial equality,
educational opportunity, and democratic legitimacy led a majority of the
Court in Grutter v. Bollinger 22 to approve of race-friendly college
admissions standards that promote educational advancement for a
"critical mass" of under-represented minorities.2 2' Justice O'Connor
acknowledged "the overriding importance of preparing students for work
and citizenship" and described education as "pivotal to sustaining our
political and cultural heritage... [and] the very foundation of good
citizenship. 222 Justices Ginsburg and Breyer agreed, adding that race-
based admission standards promote equal opportunity and conform to
"international understanding" and multi-lateral Conventions.223  These
Justices carried forward the Cold War lessons of Brown: that a learned
216. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532.
217. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
218. Though five Justices voted to dispose of the case against the plaintiff, only
four concluded that political gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable. See id. at 281
(Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., Thomas, J.) (finding political
gerrymandering claims non-justiciable); id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (dismissing
the instant claim but concluding that the Court should not foreclose all future political
gerrymandering claims); id. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (articulating "partisan
considerations" test to adjudicate justiciable gerrymandering claims); id. at 347-50
(Souter, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (stating five part political gerrymandering standard);
id. at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (identifying extreme partisanship and risk of
entrenchment as potentially problematic gerrymandering considerations).
219. Id. at316-17.
220. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
221. See generally id. at 311-44.
222. Id. at 331 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954)).
223. Id. at 344 (Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., concurring).
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citizenry authenticates participatory governance in a way that strengthens
the Nation's image before the world.
B. Rogue States and the Power of Judicial Neutralization
In the same year that Grutter was decided, six members of the Court
stood up to protect a new generation of unfairly marginalized citizens in
Lawrence v. Texas224 when they barred the state from selectively
imposing criminal penalties on same-sex couples. Texas not only stood
apart from most of the country by punishing adults who engaged in
private sexual intimacies, it contradicted the expectations of "other
nations" that form part of "our Western civilization. 225 The Court ruled
the Texas statute unconstitutional because it interfered with a protected
liberty interest that "has been accepted as an integral part of human
freedom in many countries. 226 These words, written in 2003, captured
the sentiment underlying unanimity in Brown fifty years earlier-that our
federal order of government does not permit individual states to
compromise the Nation's standing in the global community.
Most recently, in Roper v. Simmons,227 five Justices found the state
of Missouri in violation of the Eighth Amendment when it sentenced a
seventeen-year-old to death. The conclusion that the juvenile death
penalty was "cruel and unusual" rested in part on the fact that the
practice contravened international norms. Justice Kennedy wrote of the
"stark reality" that the United States was the only country in the world
that sanctioned such punishment, and that Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Nigeria, and China, among other nations known for brazen human rights
abuses, had abolished or publicly disavowed the practice.228 Imposition
224. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, addressed the claim in Lawrence under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 562. Justice O'Connor wrote a
concurring opinion that invoked the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 578.
225. Id. at 573. The Court cited with approval a decision by the European Court of
Human Rights that outlawed an Irish statute criminalizing homosexual conduct, noting
that the decision was presently authoritative in the 45 member states of the Council of
Europe. Id.
226. Id. at 577. Not every member of the Court is willing to hold American
lawmakers to international expectations. See id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("'[T]his
Court... should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans."' (quoting
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari))).
227. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
228. Id. at 575.
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of the juvenile death penalty also violated the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child, which every country in the world had ratified,
save for the United States and Somalia. 2 9 "[I]t is fair to say that the
United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against
the juvenile death penalty," Kennedy concluded.23 °
Justice Kennedy went on to explain the value of an international
consensus on the scope and status of individual rights. He identified the
"innovative principles" codified in the Constitution, including the rights
of criminal defendants, individual freedom, and human dignity that
remain "central to the American experience" and "essential to our
present-day self-definition and national identity. '231' The express
affirmation of these fundamental rights by other nations and peoples
"underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage
of freedom," he wrote.232
Even Justice O'Connor, .who dissented in Roper, acknowledged the
relevance of foreign and international law to American constitutional
jurisprudence. Not only did the Eighth Amendment itself draw meaning
"directly from the maturing values of civilized society," the Nation's
evolving standards of human dignity were connected to "the values
prevailing in other countries," she opined.233  An "international
consensus" on matters of criminal punishment, she stated, "can serve to
confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American
consensus."
234
Together, these decisions bring into the Twenty-First Century the
global consciousness that made unanimity possible in Brown. Each
spotlights the unique ability of the Court to preserve America's
reputational capital among the free nations of the world by confirming
core democratic principles. In addition, each contextualizes the role of
the judiciary within a larger framework of governmental operations by
providing concrete examples of adjudicatory outcomes that respond to
international crises. In fact, some members of the Court today
occasionally display a more formidable worldview than was apparent
even in Brown. The decision in 1954 furthered the foreign policy
229. Id. at 576.
230. Id. at 577.
231. Id. at 578.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 605 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
234. Id. O'Connor concluded that a domestic consensus against the execution of
juveniles had not developed, however.
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objectives of the Truman Administration, which itself petitioned the
Court to strike down racially segregated schools in order to advance Cold
War objectives. In Hamdi, Grutter, and Vieth, however, the Court relied
on international norms to justify judicial outcomes that expressly
contravene the policies of the present Administration.235
VI. Conclusion: Mission Accomplished?
The Court has not always responded to political exigencies in ways
that promote the ideal of American democracy. On more than one
occasion it has condoned violations of the very freedoms American
troops fought to defend in this century's wars.236 Moreover, because
foreign policy priorities too often compete with claims of fundamental
rights, the Court today has been, and will continue to be, called upon to
balance conflicting interests between government leaders and individual
citizens that in past wars aligned. In recent years, however, a majority of
the Court soldiers forward the conclusion unanimously embraced at the
height of the Cold War: that America's place in the world matters, and
the Court plays a vital role in preserving it.
An honest assessment of the Court's role in authenticating
American democracy, however, must also take account of whether its
decisions ensure actual implementation of cherished constitutional
principles. In Brown, the Court struck down racially segregated schools
but ceded to Southern demands for time to implement desegregation.
The Court waited an entire year after Brown was decided to issue a
remedial decree, and even then it cautioned the states to move ahead with
"all deliberate speed., 237  It imposed no target date for either
commencing or completing the desegregation process, and specifically
authorized district court judges, which it charged with responsibility for
monitoring compliance, to reject a plan that was too ambitious or
235. The Bush Administration's "enemy combatant" policies were directly at issue
in Hamdi. Though Grutter involved a challenge to a state affirmative action program, the
Justice Department submitted an amicus brief in the case asking the Court to hold race-
based admission policies unconstitutional. See Br. for the United States, as Amicus
Curiae, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306. The outcome in Vieth maintained a
Republican congressional stronghold which appreciably improved the ability of George
Bush to advance his Administration's political objectives. Redistricting efforts
throughout the nation are widely understood to favor the policies of the present
administration. See R.G. Ratclliffe, DeLay's Investment Pays Off, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Oct. 10, 2003, at Al.
236. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
237. See Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 301.
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interrupt a plan that proved too disruptive in application. 238  State
lawmakers exploited this arrangement and intentionally subverted Brown
while federal officials willingly looked the other away. 239 The racial
composition of Southern schools changed little in the first decade after
Brown,24° and today are fast reverting to a state of segregation not seen in
thirty years.241
More recent cases that purport to affirm America's democratic
pedigree have been rendered as fractured opinions, and the outcome
reached by a majority of Justices is often undercut by political action.
Yasser Hamdi was never afforded access to an attorney or a due process
hearing as the Court required, but was "released" by the Executive
Branch to Saudi Arabia on the condition that he renounce his United
States citizenship. 242  In Vieth, five Justices recognized an Equal
Protection claim for political gerrymandering, but could not agree on a
basis for determining when a district dilutes the weight of a vote in
violation of constitutional standards.243 The Court effectively recognized
a cause of action for a claim that cannot be judicially enforced.
There is more. The Court in Grutter emphasized the value of
education to productive and effective citizenship when it upheld
diversity-based affirmative action plans.244 Yet the political opposition to
affirmative action has led many colleges and universities to abandon
programs intended to promote access to students of color despite
discriminatory obstacles that continue to manipulate admission criteria to
the benefit of non-minorities.245  In Lawrence, though the Court
recognized a substantive right to sexual intimacy, it declined to ascribe
full legal protection to gay and lesbian citizens against other forms of
discrimination. Following the decision, twelve states passed
238. See id. at 299-301.
239. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Tilting at Windmills: Brown II and the Hopeless Quest
to Resolve Deep-Seated Social Conflict Through Litigation, 24 LAW & INEQ. 31, 34-38
(2006).
240. Id. at 34 ("By the 1963-64 school year, barely one in one hundred African-
American children in the eleven Southern states of the Old Confederacy was in a school
with Whites.").
241. See GARY ORFIELD, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE: CONSEQUENCES OF A DECADE OF RESEGREGATION 2 (2001).
242. Joel Brinkley, U.S. Releases Saudi-American It Had Captured in Afghanistan,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at A15.
243. See supra note 218.
244. See supra notes 220-23, and accompanying text.
245. Jonathan D. Glater, Colleges Open Minority Aid to All Comers, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2006, at Al.
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referendums to ban same-sex marriages in an effort to forestall further
recognition of the human dignity that inheres in every individual of any
24
sexual orientation. 46 Finally, in Roper, the Court's decision to outlaw
the juvenile death penalty, though consistent with international standards,
fell short of meeting the growing consensus against imposition of the
death penalty under any circumstance.247
Thus, while the Court has attempted to confirm America's
democratic heritage through the process of judicial decision-making, its
own efforts on occasion fail to ensure to a meaningful degree that
democratic principles will be realized. In other instances, democratic
momentum meets opposition, ironically, by democratic branches of
government. The merits of the Court's internationalist approach can be
debated, as can the response by elected officials to judicial
internationalism. What appears undeniable, however, is the Court's
continuing role in attempting to authenticate American democracy in
times of global exigency.
246. These measures brought to nineteen the total number of states that restrict
marriage to the union of one man and one woman. See Texas Approves Gay Marriage
Ban, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 9, 2005, at Al; America Votes 2004, Ballot
Measures, http://www.cm.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/resultsiballot.measures (last
visited Apr. 20, 2006).
247. "The world continued to move closer to the universal abolition of capital
punishment during 2005. By the end of the year 86 countries had abolished the death
penalty for all crimes .... 11 countries had abolished it for all but exceptional crimes,
such as wartime crimes. At least 25 [other] countries ... had not carried out any
executions for the previous 10 years or more and were either believed to have an
established practice of not carrying out executions or had made an international
commitment not to do so." Amnesty International, Death Penalty Developments in 2005,
http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/7F1DAA21 CB800C9080257155005
3EODE.
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